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DURING the past decade the traditional solution to the issue of direct
vs. indirect taxation has been subjected to serious challenge. Whereas
earlier the theoretical superiority of direct over indirect taxation was
accepted as virtually axiomatic, now it must be regarded as something
that cannot be "proved," and that in principle has to be investigated
for each particular case. The traditional case for direct taxation rested
on its alleged "neutrality" among the alternatives open to consumers.
Whereas an indirect tax on one item of consumption made that item
artificially expensive to consumers, relative to other goods, and thus
consumers were faced with relative prices that did not reflect the relative
marginal costs of production of different goods, an income tax was
generally held to be free of this defect. The income tax, it was held,
was similar to a system of excise taxes striking all commodities with an
equal percentage tax rate. Whatever might be the ratios between the
marginal costs of producing different goods, the same ratios would
(under competition) apply to the prices facing consumers. Marginal
rates of substitution in consumption (given by the ratios of gross-of-tax
prices between pairs of goods) would therefore be equal to marginal
rates of substitution in production (given by the corresponding ratios
of net-of-tax prices).
Many economists realized, long before 1951, that this proposition
This introductory section is meant to serve, in addition to the usual functions
of an introduction, as a guide to readers who might otherwise be put off by the
amount of mathematics that appears in the main body of the paper. The principal
motivation for and conclusions from each section are set out here in nonmathematical
terms, so that readers may skip any offending section of the main text without sub—
stantial loss of continuity. For the further guidance of readers, let me here point
out that Section IV contains the most mathematical manipulation, and can be
skipped with the aid of the summary in the introduction without serious loss. See—
tion II, on the other hand, develops the fundamental framework that is used through-
out the paper. Skipping this section therefore entails substantial loss of content.
I have tried, in Section II, to develop the basic argument with the aid of graphical
analysis, so as to ease the burden on less mathematically oriented readers, and I
hope, accordingly, that most readers will be able to work through the derivations
presented there. In comparison with Sections II and IV, the remaining sections
contain only a modest amount of mathematical manipulation.
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would have to be modified in a situation in which the supply of labor
was other than completely inelastic. But the extent of the required modi-
fication was not appreciated. In point of fact, the required modification
is so great that it destroys any theoretical presumption of the superiority
of direct over indirect taxation. This was pointed out by Little in his
fundamental paper written in 1951.2He.presented a simple example
in which labor was the only factor of production and in which there
were only three "goods": say, bread, wine, and leisure. In this case, an
excise tax on wine would distort the choices between wine and bread
and between wine and leisure, but would leave the choice between bread
and leisure undistorted. Similarly, an excise tax on bread would distort
the choices between bread and wine and between bread and leisure, but
would leave the choice between wine and leisure undistorted. However,
an income tax (interpreted as an equal-rate excise tax on both bread and
wine) would distort the choices between bread and leisure and between
wine and leisure, leaving the choice between bread and wine undistorted.
Each of the three cases distorts two of the three possible choices, while
leaving the third choice undistorted. There is thus no qualitative differ-
ence between the nature of the effect of direct as against indirect taxa-
tion. Any preference for direct taxation over indirect must therefore be
based on quantitative rather than qualitative comparisons, or else on
grounds (like equity or political feasibility) that are not strictly
economic.
This challenge to the traditional preference for direct taxation pro-
vides the focus for most of the present paper. Once Little's argument is
appreciated, we can no longer resolve the issue by saying that distortions
are present in the indirect-tax case but absent in the direct-tax case. We
must recognize that distortions are present in both cases, obtain relevant
measures of their effects, and then compare these measures. The relevant
measure, in this case, is the cost to the economy of the inefficiencies
resulting from tax-induced distortions of choices. This cost, which I like
to call the welfare cost of a tax system, has traditionally been labeled
the "excess burden" of taxation.
Section II of the paper is an attempt to expound the principles of
measuring the welfare costs of a set of taxes in a case where all goods
are produced at constant cost. The case chosen is a particularly simple
one, because, with the simplification of constant costs, the argument
2J•M. D. Little, "Direct Versus Indirect Taxes," Economic Journal, September
1951, pp. 577—584.
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c in he carried out in diagrammatic terms.3 From this exercise a general
expression is derived, from which we can determine the welfare cost of
any given pattern of taxes on final goods and services when production
is governed by constant costs, when distortions other than taxes are
absent, and when the amount of labor supplied by each individual to
the market does not vary as a consequence of changes in tax rates.
In Section III we generalize the result of Section II, incorporating
the possibility of tax-induced changes in the supply of labor. Thus we
face up directly to the problem posed by Little, for the formulation of
Section III shows how it is possible to measure the welfare cost of an
income tax and to compare this with the welfare costs induced by alter-
native patterns of indirect taxation. To emphasize the possibility of
extracting useful numerical results from analyses of this type, an attempt
is made at the conclusion of Section III to estimate the welfare cost
of the U.S. personal income tax. It should be borne in mind that this
exercise is intended mainly as an example of how the job might be done,
and not as a definitive analysis of the U.S. income tax. Among other
things, the measurement effort of Section III takes account only of the
costs of the personal income tax arising from the labor-leisure choice,
and not those that affect occupational choice, investment decisions, etc.
Moreover, the measurement is based on crude and scanty evidence of a
highly a.ggregative nature, whereas a more complete analysis would take
into account the differential responses of different classes of labor supply
to tax incentives (e.g., distinguishing between the effects of taxation
on labor-force participation rates of women and men). Finally, the
measurement in Section III (as distinct from the theory presented) is
based on the assumption that the income tax is the only tax present
in the system, or, perhaps more plausibly, on the assumption that the
welfare costs of the personal income tax are not altered by the many
other taxes that are present in the U.S. system.
In spite of these qualifications, however, I feel that the exercise of
Section III provides us with some useful insights. The estimated welfare
cost of the U.S. personal income tax is about $1 billion per year—hardly
a negligible figure. Yet the simplifying assumptions just alluded to prob-
ably have the effect of understating the true cost. It is hard indeed,
in the light of this result, to hold to the traditional position that the
personal income tax is truly neutral.
For a more general mathematical treatment, see my paper, "The Measurement of
WaMe," American Economic Review, May 1964.
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In Section IV we attempt a direct comparison of the welfare costs of
income and excise taxation. This entails nothing more than a straight-
forward application of the general formulation derived in Section III,
but some relevant insights are obtained by carrying out the steps. As
the first step in Section IV, we try to find the "best" way of raising a
given amount of revenue by commodity taxation. We find, as others4
have previously shown, that an income tax (i.e., a tax striking all goods
and services other than leisure at an equal rate) will be the "best" way
only in very unusual circumstances. If, as seems to be the case in the
real world, we cannot tax leisure as such, then the "best" tax system
we can achieve under this constraint is one that strikes at higher-than-
average rates those goods that are complements to or poorer-than-aver-
age substitutes for leisure, and that strikes at lower-than-average rates
those goods that are better-than-average substitutes for leisure. An
income tax is "best," given the constraint that leisure cannot be taxed,
only if all goods are equally good substitutes for leisure (i.e., only if a
tax on leisure would lead to an equiproportional change in the consump-
tion of each and every good and service).
This conclusion could indeed be shattering to the principle of direct
taxation if it meant that the welfare costs of taxation could be greatly
lowered by having widely different rates of taxation on different goods
and services as against the equal rates implied by income taxation. It
does not appear, however, that this is the case. One way of determining
the answer to the question just posed is to compare the welfare cost of a
particular indirect tax with the welfare cost of an income tax yielding
equal revenue. This is the second step taken in Section IV. It recog-
nizes that the relevant substitute for an indirect tax is not "no tax at all"
but rather some other manner of obtaining the same yield, and it con-
siders the particular alternative represented by income taxation. The
result of this exercise is that, as long as the excise tax in question is not
itself a very general tax (striking a large fraction of all goods and thus
approaching an income tax in coverage), and as long as the elasticity of
demand for the commodity or commodities subject to excise tax is not
very small, the substitution of an income tax for the excise tax in ques-
tion will very likely result in a reduction of welfare cost.
The third step in Section IV attempts to make the preceding compari-
See Little in Economic Journal, September 1951; W. J. Corlett and D. C. Hague,
"Complementarity and the• Excess Burden of Taxation," Review of Economic Studies,
No. 54, 1953—54, pp. 21—30; J. E. Meade, Trade and Welfare, Vol. II, Mathematical
Supplement, London, 1955; R. G. Lipsey and K. Lancaster, "The General Theory
of Second Best," Review of Economic Studies, No. 63, 1956—57, pp. 11—32.
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son a bit more realistic. One of the key propositions that emerges from
the study of welfare costs iii a general- equilibrium framework (such as
that taken in this paper) is that the effects of a particular tax depend not
only on that tax itself but on the other taxes that are present along with
it. The comparison made in step two of Section IV considers an excise
tax that is being used as the sole tax in the system, and is replaced by
and compared with an income tax of equal yield. In step three of Section
IV we alter this comparison, and instead consider an excise tax which,
when present, stands side by side with an income tax of a given size.
We compare this setup with an alternative one in which the excise
tax is taken off and replaced by a sufficient rise in the rate of income
tax to produce the same total yield as was previously obtained from the
excise and income taxes combined. This comparison is slightly more
complicated than that undertaken in step two, but does not greatly
alter the conclusion. Broadly speaking, there is still a strong presumption
in favor of replacing excise taxation with income taxation, as long as the
excise taxation itself is not very general and as long as the taxed com-
modities do not have very low elasticities of demand. When one comes
to consider excise taxes that have very low rates and/or very broad
bases, however, the result is no longer so clear. In these cases, considera-
tions of the complementarity (or low substitutability) of an excise-taxed
commodity with leisure might weigh the final judgment in favor of
retaining the excise tax rather than replacing it by an adjustment of
income tax rates. One might say, in short, that the theoretical case in
favor of direct taxation has been forced into full retreat by the considera-
tions raised by Little and others in recent years; but that the practical
case remains comparatively unscathed, particularly where the excise
taxes in question have relatively high rates and do not strike a very
high proportion of consumer expenditures.
In Section V the effects of taxation on saving are considered. The
treatment, far briefer than the subject deserves, focuses on the non-
neutrality of ordinary income taxation with respect to the saving
decision, and on the measurement of the welfare costs engendered by
this nonneutrality. It is shown that income taxation has the effect of
reducing the rate of saving, when the alternative to the income tax is a
consumption tax yielding the same amount each year. A simple formula
for estimating the welfare costs of the distortions introduced by income
taxation through its influence upon the savings decision is then pre-
sented. In terms of this formula, a very rough judgment is reached on
the possible order of magnitude of this class of welfare costs in the
29TAXATION, RESOURCE ALLOCATION, WELFARE
United States economy. Finally, it is suggested that the welfare costs
stemming from the differential tax treatment of different kinds of income
from capital in the U.S. are likely to be substantially greater than the
welfare costs arising from the influence of taxation on the saving decision
as such. That is to say, the U.S. economy very likely suffers greater
costs from tax-induced misallocations of its given capital stock than
from the influence of taxation on the over-all size of that capital stock.
Finally, in Section VI, an effort is made to draw some conclusions
from the preceding analysis on the influence of taxation on economic
growth. Since previous sections of this paper are concerned mainly
with the labor-leisure choice and with the saving decision, the discussion
of taxation and growth is focused in these terms. The conclusion is
reached that the effects of taxation on the labor-leisure choice have a
truly negligible effect on the economy's rate of growth, but that the
effect of taxation on the saving decision may reduce the economy's
annual rate of growth by as much as one-tenth or two-tenths of a
percentage point. For those who are surprised by the small effect of
taxation via the saving decision, Section VI reviews the evidence sup-
porting this result.
To set the stage for the treatment which follows, I should first like
to discuss certain key assumptions that will be used throughout this
paper.
1. It is assumed that, under any two situations being compared, the
economy's productive resources are fully employed. This assumption
is the conventional one in studies of the allocative effects of taxation.
The resource allocation question can be framed as "how will our re-
sources be used?" as distinct from the alternative income-and-employ-
ment question of "will some of our resources be idle?" The effect of this
assumption, for the problems treated in this paper, is to restrict the set
of possible resource allocations to that determined by the production
frontier of the economy. Thus in Figure 1, the alternative bundles of
goods Xi and X2 produced in any of the cases to be compared will lie
somewhere along the production frontier AB. A production point like C,
indicating that the economy is not producing up to its potential, is
ruled out by assumption.
2. It is assumed that, under any two alternative taxes to be compared,
the government will obtain just that amount of purchasing power needed
to buy a given bundle of goods. One need not belabor the point that if
we are to discuss the effects of a given tax on resource allocation, we
must implicitly or explicitly compare the situation in which that tax
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x2
4
exists with some alternative situation. Once this is recognized, we have
a variety of choices. We can compare the "tax situation" with a "no-tax
situation" or with any possible combination of alternative taxes. But
this is not the worst of it. If the total revenues of the government have
different purchasing power in the cases being compared, we must either
have differing amounts of deficit or surplus iii the two cases, or differing
amounts of government expenditure. If surpluses or deficits differ, de-
flationary or inflationary forces are set in motion by the tax change, and
we are taken from the realm of allocative theory into that of income-and-
employment analysis. If government expenditures differ in the two cases,
we must inquire into how the government spends its added revenue or re-
duces its prior expenditures. This opens a Pandora's box of possibilities in
an analysis of resource allocation effects, for there are an infinity of ways
in which the government could allocate any increase or reduction in
expenditures. To avoid having to guess what the government would do
with its money, we simply assume that the government would do the
same thing in both the situations being compared. This, together with
the previous assumption, enables us to conceive of a "consumption
frontier" or, perhaps better, a private-sector expenditures frontier, ob-
tained by deducting the fixed pattern of government purchases from
the economy's production frontier. Thus, in Figure 2, every point on the
"consumption frontier" CDisobtained by deducting the fixed amounts
of government purchases G1 and G2 from the corresponding point on the
production frontier AB. As long as the government is getting the bundle
(G1, G2) of X1 and X2, and as long as the economy is operating on the
production frontier, production will take place somewhere within the
segment EF of AB, and the "consumption" of the private sector must
lie somewhere along CDinany two cases being compared.
3. It is assumed that the changes in output dictated by the changes
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intax policy being considered are accomplished at (approximately)
constant unit cost. Taken strictly, this assumption requires that the
production frontier be linear within the relevant range. Taken less
strictly, it requires only that the production frontier be reasonably well
approximated by a linear function within the relevant range. I am pre-
pared to argue that this is likely to be the case for the changes in output
which would be induced by plausible changes in the taxes now in force
in the United States. But I must confess that this assumption is mainly
dictated by considerations of convenience. The mathematical parts of.
subsequent sections of this paper would be greatly complicated if the
assumption of constant costs were abandoned, and yet the principal
qualitative conclusions of the analysis would be unaffected.
4. It is assumed that, where "welfare costs" are being measured, the
tax setup being considered has as its alternative a tax system of similar
over-all incidence. The alternatives being compared are assumed to have
similar over-all incidence in order to isolate the allocative effects of
taxation from its redistributive effects. For example, if we are concerned
with the effects of eliminating a tax on jewelry, whose incidence among
income brackets is as indicated in colunm 1 of Table 1, we might so
adjust income-tax rates as to increase income-tax collections from each
bracket by approximately these same amounts. Thus if income-tax col-
lections, by bracket, were originally as given by column 2 of Table 1,
we would consider an income tax collecting the amounts given in column
3 to be an appropriate alternative to the tax setup given by columns 1
and 2.
This is not to say that the real alternatives faced by policy-makers are
likely to be as neatly comparable as those in Table 1. But if the practical
alternative (say, 3) to alternative 1 is an income tax which is different
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TABLE1











1 20 50 70
2 30 100 130
3 40 200 240
4 50 400 450
5 60 1,000 1,060
from 1 to 3 as the sum of a move from 1 to 2, which we would evaluate
using purely allocative criteria,5 plus a move from 2 to 3, which we
would evaluate using purely distributive criteria.
II. Measuring the Welfare Cost of Excise Taxes
In this section, we begin by outlining the "textbook" treatment of
welfare cost in the simplest terms, and proceed to extend the analysis
to more complicated cases. The textbook case is illustrated in Figure 3.
We are to compare a situation in which there is an excise tax of $1
per unit of X (X =X4;=$2.00)with a situation in which this tax
does not exist, but in which the government is raising equivalent revenue
by an income tax (X =X0;=$1).It is important to recognize at the
outset thatis defined as holding government revenues constant.
Thus at P4 we have government revenues equal to ($1)(X4), all obtained
from the excise tax on X. As we move to P3, the excise tax must be
lowered to $.75, and government revenues from the excise tax alone are
only ($.75) (X3). However, since government revenues must be constant
all along the curve, there must be, at point P3, income taxation to yield
($1)(X4) —($.75)(X3).At P2 income taxes must yield ($1)(X4) —
Strictly speaking, one can eliminate distributive criteria in evaluating the move
from 1 to 2 only when each and every individual bears the same burden of tax in
both cases. Actually, the move frbm 1 to 2 as described above would entail some
redistribution of income in favor of jewelry purchasers and away from those who
do not purchase jewelry or purchase only small amounts relative to the average of
their income bracket. But this redistribution is entirely within income brackets, and
thus is not likely in itself to significantly alter the pattern of demand. Moreover, if
the equal treatment of equals is accepted as a goal of tax policy, one would have
to regard the move from 1 to 2 as having beneficial effects on distribution (differing
tastes of people with similar incomes should not make these people "unequal").
Thus, as long as there would be an allocative gain on this move, we can consider it
as being slightly reinforced by distributive considerations.







($.50) (X2); at P1 they must yield ($1) (X4) —($.25)(Xi); and at P0
they must yield ($1)(X4).
The simplest exposition of the measurement of the welfare cost of
excise taxation can be made by looking only at the left-hand diagram
in Figure 3. As between the situation (X9, P0) and the situation (X4, P4),
consumers have gf\ren up (X0 —X4)units of the good X. The value
placed by them on the first unit given up was $1, but subsequent units
had higher values. If we think of the tax being gradually raised from
zero to $1, this is clearly evident. When the tax is raised from zero to
$.01, the units of X given up have values between $1 and $1.01; when
the tax is raised from $.01 to $.02, the units of X given up have values
between $1.01 and $1.02. Finally, when the tax is raised from $.99 to
$1.00, consumers value the units of X given up at between $1.99 and
$2.00. The sum total of the value placed by consumers on all the X
they have given up in the process of raising the tax from zero to $1
can be measured by the area X0P0P4X4.
But in the process of demanding less X as a consequence of the tax,
consumers have released resources from industry X and increased their
demand for other goods (Y). The measure X0P0P4X4 therefore over-
states their real loss; from it we have to deduct the value of the extra Y
they consume in the excise-tax case. Where there is no tax (or other
divergence between the value placed by consumers on the marginal
product of productive factors and the rewards received by those factors)
on Y, the value to consumers of the extra Y they have in case (X4, P4)
compared to case (X0, F0) can simply be measured by the area X0P0FX4.
This represents the amount which was originally paid in industry X
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from XOPQP4X4 leaves the triangle P0P4F as the measure of the welfare
cost or "excess burden" of a $1 per unit excise tax on X.
The right-hand diagram in. Figure 3 may help readers to verify that
XOPOFX4 does in fact measure the value to consumers of the extra Y
they demand as a consequence of the tax on X. Again, considering a
sequence in which the tax on X is gradually raised from zero to $1.,
we have first a slight displacement of the demand curve for Y as the
price of X is raised from $1.00 to $1.01, and a little extra Y is bought
at the price of $1.00. As the price of X is raised from $1.01 to $1.02,
another slight displacement of the demand curve for Y occurs,
alittle extra Y is bought at the price of $1. Summing up the values to
consumers of the successive increments to V generated by raisingall
the way to $2.00, we obtain the area YOGHY4, which is equal to the area
XOPOFX4 in the left-hand diagram.
There is no contribution to welfare cost (corresponding to the triangle
P0P4F) coming from the market for Y because, by assumption, no dis-
tortions are present in that market. The resource cost of an extra unit
of V is $1.00, and the moment consumers find that it is worth $1 to
buy an extra unit of Y, they can freely do so. Thus the value to consum-
ers of each extra unit of Y they take is equal to the price they pay for it.
To summarize the result obtained so far, when a tax on X ofper
unit is the only distortion present, the welfare cost of that tax can be
measured by — where is the change in the consumption
of X induced by the tax. If we define as the percentage
rate of tax, we can note that (with constant costs) it also represents the
percentage change in the price of X. We then can derive tiX =
whereis the own-price elasticity of demand for X. Substituting this
expression for and forin the cost measure (— we
obtain as an. alternative expression for the welfare cost of an excise tax
— This expresses the welfare cost of a tax in terms of
the total net-of-tax receipts from sales of the product in question;
theown-price elasticity of demand for the product (a negative number);
andthe effective percentage rate of tax. Since the total tax yield,
can be expressed as we can also express the welfare cost
of the tax as — Since data onandare usually available
for any existing tax, onlyneed be estimated to obtain a measure
of the welfare cost of such a tax.
In the course of this paper we shall show that this simple textbook
measure of welfare cost is not a bad approximation in the cases of most
existing taxes. But in order to reach this conclusion, we must modify
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the above analysis to take account of the main ways in which the real-
world situation diverges from that depicted in Figure 3.
By far the most disquieting assumption underlying Figure 3 and the
analysis of it is the assumption that no excise taxes or other distortions
exist in the "rest" of the economy (industry Y). It is possible, however,
to modify the analysis so as to avoid making this assumption.




to be $1.50, consisting of a unit cost of $1 plus a tax of $.50 per unit.
Once again, as we envision the tax on X being raised in small steps
from 0 to $1.00 per unit, we obtain the area X0P0P4X4 as measuring
the value to consumers of the (X0 —X4)units of X that they are induced
to forego as a consequence of the tax.
The difference between this and the earlier case appears in the right-
hand diagram of Figure 4. Whereas, in Figure 3, consumers were initially
paying $1 per unit of Y, and continued paying that price after the tax
was imposed on X, now, in Figure 4, consumers are initially paying
$1.50 per unit of Y, and continue to pay that price throughout the
exercise. Hence the value to consumers of the extra Y that they are
induced to consume by the tax on X is Y0IJY4, rather than YOGHY4.
In the present case, therefore, the net change in the welfare of consumers
as a result of the tax on X is measured by the difference between a loss
of X0P0P4X4 (on account of [X0 —X4]units of X being foregone), and
a gain of Y0IJY4 (on account of [V4 —Yo]more units of V being con-
sumed). Since the areas XOPOFX4 and YOGHY4 are equal as before (the
cost of production of the addition to Y is the same as the reduction
in production costs of X), the net loss in the welfare of consumers can be
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YOGHY4 =XOPFX4,we can express GIJH =(tn)X (X0PFX4) =
This, in turn, can be expressed as OIJH = Now
P0P4F =— so that the net loss in welfare from placing a tax
ofon X in the presence of an already existing tax of 4, on Y can be ex-
pressed as:
lvD 1 10 r4 — — — — —
Fromthis it can be seen that there is a clear gain from placing a tax
on X equal to the pre-existing tax on Y. The expression — is
always positive, and the expression —24,is negative when=4,.
Therefore the "cost" of movingfrom zero to 4,isnegative, indicating
a gain in welfare.
In the example chosen for Figure 4,was set at twice ti,. Thus the
expression above indicates that there is no gain or loss in welfare. This
can be verified by looking at Figure 4. The loss measured by the triangle
P0P4F is just counterbalanced by the gain measured by the rectangle
GIJH.6
The extension of this result to the case of three or more commodities
is self-evident. In Figure 5, we assume that a tax of $.50 per unit on
and one of $.25 per unit on X3 were already in existence before a tax
of $1.00 per unit was levied on X1. The reduction in welfare of consumers
as a consequence of the tax on X1 is measured by the area ABC minus
the sum of the areas DEFG and HIJK.
We can now turn to the derivation of a general expression for the
welfare cost of a set of excise taxes. Assume there are three commodities,
X1, X2, X3, all of which are taxed. The welfare cost of the whole set
6Boththe rectangle and the triangle have equal bases, but the height of the
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of taxes can be measured by taking first the welfare cost of a tax on X1,
with no other taxes in existence; adding to this the addition to the welfare
cost obtained by imposing a tax on X2, given that the tax on X1 already
exists; and finally adding the increment to the welfare cost incurred
by imposing a tax on X3, given that the taxes on Xi and X2 already exist.
Since the effects of the taxes will be analyzed in three steps, let us
denote bythose changes taking place in the first step (when a tax
is imposed on X1), and byandrespectively,those changes taking
place in the second and third steps.
When a tax of T1 is imposed on X1, with no taxes on X2 and X3, the
welfare cost is simply
— (a)
i.e., the triangle P0P4F in Figure 3. When a tax of T2 is imposed on X2
in the presence of a tax of T1 on X1, the addition to welfare cost is
— — (b)
The first component is the triangle under the demand curve for X2
(corresponding to ABC in Figure 5), and the second is the offset (corre-
sporiding to DEFG in Figure 5) arising from the fact that a tax on
already exists. (There is no offset corresponding to HIJK in Figure 5,
because at this step we have not yet imposed any tax on X3.)
When a tax of T3 is imposed on X3 in the presence of taxes of T1 and T2
on X1 and X2, the addition to welfare cost is
— — (c)
The sum of (a) + (b) + (c)givesus the welfare cost of the set of taxes
(T1, T2, T3) taken together. Let me here introduceas a general
notation for 8X1/aP,, defined to include just the substitution effect.
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Substituting into (a), (b), and (c), and summing, we obtain as the ex-
pression for the welfare cost of the set of taxes
— — — S12T1T2—S13T1T3—
or alternatively
+ + + 2812T1T2 + 2813T1T3 + 2S23T2T3j.




This is one of three fundamental forms in which the welfare cost of a set
of taxes may be written. The second fundamental form may be derived
by breaking up (a) + (b) + (c) into expressions reflecting changes in
the quantity of each commodity. Thus we have, from commodity 1,
— —
Denoting the total change in X1 by = + A2X1 + we
may express this as
— — (a')
Likewise, we have for commodity 2,
—
which we can express as
— + (b')
Finally, we have for commodity 3,
lrrA V
which can be expressed as
+ + (c')
The sum of (a') + (b') + (c') will give us the welfare cost of the set
of taxes under consideration. But six of the nine terms in the sum cancel
7The equality of withp
is one of the fundamental properties of demand
relationships reflecting the substitution effect only. See John R. Hicks, Value and
Capital, p. 311. Hicks uses the notation to refer to what we have called Se,. It
is not easy to give an intuitive interpretation of why &, should equal Si. The best
I can do is as follows: If the prices of both X1 and X2 rise by 1 per cent, no substi-
tution effects will take place between them. This means that the substitution effect
between Xi and X2 which takes place because of a rise of 1 per cent in Pi is annulled
by the substitution effect taking place as a result of a 1 per cent rise in P2. Now
the transfer of purchasing power from X1 to X2 taking place as a result of a 1 per cent
rise in the price ofis given by P2(0X2/aP1)P1. And the transfer of purchasing
power from X2 to X1 resulting from a 1 per cent rise in the price of X2 is equal to
Pi(aXi/e9P2)P2. In order for the second effect to annul the first, must
equal (aX1/9P2), or 821 =812.
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each other out. Consider the two terms + We know
that =S12T2,and =821T1.Thus these terms can be ex-
pressed as lrprpQ iT
which must equal zero since 812 =821.By the same token, each of the
pairs of terms (— + and (— + must
equal zero. Thus the second fundamental expression for welfare cost
reduces to
— — =
To derive the third form of the expression for welfare cost, consider
the expression (first form), letting=unitcost of commodity i,the
percentage rate of tax on commodity i, and =the unit tax on 1,
lrcY2cli2 i icv2ci42 T •T
+2C1C2S12t1t2+ 2C1C3S13t1t3 + 2C2C3823t213].
Now we make use of the well-known relationship among the
C
2ç142 Cl (142 1'Jll&l — 1 — 13k)13L'l
ri2cjZ —ci ci ci c'42
U2k)22&2— '.,1',i2k)12('2—





8 This relationship can be interpreted intuitively in two ways. First, when there is
a linear constraint of the form =K,then, as long as the constraint is satisfied,
C —i= 0,for any definition of z. Thus setting z =P2,we have—' 0,or
i ôz oP1
= 0.Alternatively, we may start from the general property of substitution
effects that "only relative prices count." This says that the effect onof a 1 per cent
rise in its price would be annulled by a 1 per cent rise in all other prices. The effect
onof a 1 per cent rise in its own price is given by
=
The effect onof a 1 per cent rise in the price of X5 is = The effect
onof a 1 per cent rise in all other prices is In order for the first effect,
to be offset by the second, we must have
+ =0,or =0.
Now if, as we do when measuring the total welfare cost of a set of distortions, we
are measuring this cost as against an undistorted initial situation, we can charac-
terize the undistorted situation as one in which, for all j, P2 =kC1;that is, prices
bear •the same relationship to unit costs forall commodities. Thus we have
kG, =0,or =0.See Hicks, Value and Capital, pp. 310—311.
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On the left-hand side of the equalities in the six equations above, we
have the terms appearing within the bracket in the expression for we!-
fare cost (first form). On the right-hand side, we have the expressions
which will be used in deriving the third form. To do so, we simply
collect terms in Si2, and S23, yielding




Summing the three terms to the right of the equalities, we have an
expression equivalent to that in brackets in the first form measure of
the welfare cost. Since the bracket is multiplied by (— wehave for
our third fundamental form of the measure for the welfare cost:
A V' V Q.ii. —
2Ls h_s V
Ii<i
The expression for the welfare cost of a set of taxes can be derived
directly from utility functions as follows.
U =U(X1,X2,.. ., (1)
Taking a Taylor expansion up to quadratic terms, we have
=E + where= and(2)
Ui1=
Nowis itself a function of the X/s, so
= X2,.. , and (3)
=E (4)
2
Thus we can rewrite (2) as
= + E (5)
If consumers maximize utility subject to their money income and the
prices facing them in any situation, we have, as a first-order condition
of maximum, that
= (6)
where A is a Lagrange multiplier representing the marginal utility of
money. Obviously, from (6)
=ASP.+ P4x. (7)
Substituting (6) and (7) into (5), we have
=APAX. + + (8)
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Interpreting the in (8) as representing the prices in an undistorted
situation (i.e., as being proportional to unit costs), we havePAX, =
which must equal zero under our assumption of constant
costs (linear transformation functions). Thus (8) reduces to
= (9)
To translateU from utility terms into money terms, we must divide
by the marginal utility of money. Thus money value of change in
utility equals
= (10)
which expressed as a cost is — When the only disturbances
between the two situations being compared are taxes, we have
Thus from (10) we can deriveE as the measure of the welfare
cost of a set of taxes (T1, ..., Ta).Moreover, since we require that
changes in theall take place along a linear constraint, without
first-order income effects, we can express = =
I I
Substitutingthis into — we obtain
t
asan alternative (equivalent) measure of welfare cost. This derivation
is essentially the same as that given by H. Hotelling.9 Hicks derives
the expression (in his notation X,.8 dP,. dP8) by a
1 r 8
somewhatdifferent route.'°
III. Measuring theWelfareCost of Income Taxation
In this section we apply the apparatus derived in the previous section
to the problem of direct taxation with particular reference to the choice
between labor and leisure. We shall disregard problems connected with
the choice between consumption and saving, which will be dealt with
separately below, and shall accordingly assume that all goods are direct
consumption goods, and that all income is spent on such goods. The
income tax will be represented as a flat-rate excise tax striking all goods
(other than leisure) at the same percentage rate.
"The General Welfare in Relation to Problems of Taxation and of Railway and
Utility Rates," Econometrica, July 1938.
'°Valueand Capital, p. 331.
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To begin, let us briefly review the traditional case for preferring direct
to indirect taxation. Here leisure is not considered as a good, and the
supply of work is assumed to be unaffected by alterations in the pattern
of taxation. The third fundamental form of the expression for welfare
cost, i.e.,
1 14 i ji<j
shows that an income tax has no welfare cost under the assumptions
stated above. Since, under an income tax (with no concomitant excise
taxes) t1 =t,,for all. i and j,everyterm in the summation is equal to zero.
On the other hand, no pattern of taxes on individual commodities
can have a negative welfare cost, since by definition the welfare cost
of a total set of taxes is measured against a neutral alternative." The
best one could do, then, with unequal taxation of different goods, would
be to have a zero 'welfare cost (such as would be the case if all goods
but one were taxed equally, and the last good—taxed at a different rate—
had a zero own-price elasticity of demand). But except in such curious
and unrealistic cases, the welfare cost of a system of unequal excise
taxes will be positive.
When leisure is introduced as a separate good, however, these state-
ments no longer hold. Now an income tax must be interpreted as an
equal-rate tax on all goods except leisure. Hence the income tax is no
longer a truly geneii'al tax, and cannot be presumed to have a zero wel-
fare cost. As Little has pointed out, in a world of three goods, X1, X2,
and X3, where X3 is leisure, an equal percentage tax on Xi and X2 at the
rate of t1 =12leaves undistorted consumers' choices between X1 and X2,
but distorts choices between X1 and X3 and between X2 and X3. On
the other hand, taxing only X1 distorts the choices between X1 and X2
and between X1 and X3, while leaving undistorted the choice between
X2 and X3. Similarly, a tax on X2 introduces distortions between X2 and
X1, and between X2 and X3, but leaves choices between X1 and X3
undistorted.12 In each case a distortion is introduced into choices in
two pairs of goods, and choice in the third pair is left undistorted. In this
sense, therefore, an income tax is on a par with an excise tax. Any
preference for income taxation, from a welfare point of view, must be
11Formally,the expression is negative or zero for any values of
the T's. So — must be positive or zero. See Hicks, Value and Capital,
p. 311.
12M. D. Little, "])irect Versus Indirect Taxes," Economic Journal, September
1951, pp. 577—584.
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based on empirical considerations, not on a clear qualitative superiority
of income taxation in all conceivable circumstances. We now turn,
therefore, to the development of some propositions which will be of
help in evaluating alternative patterns of taxation when the labor-
leisure choice is explicitly taken into account.
First, considering the case in which there are three goods, of which the
third is leisure, we may inquire into the effect of an income tax (i.e.,
a tax on Xi and X2 at the percentage rate t). For convenience, let us
introduce at this juncture a harmless convention—we choose our units
of commodities in such a way that their unit cost, isunity for every
commodity. Thus we may say that the unit of leisure, for a given indi-
vidual, is that amount of time in which he would earn a dollar, if work-
ing. The units of X1andX2areamounts which sell for a dollar net of
taxes. This enables us to leave out the C's in our expressions for welfare
cost. The welfare cost of a tax at the rate t on X1andX2 is therefore
—t)2 -4— S13(t — 0)2 —I—S23(t —0)2] = + 823t2].
When the C's are equal to 1, the restriction on the is simply
= = 0.Thus+= and the welfare cost of a
J
proportionalincome tax at the rate t can be expressed as This
expression is directly analogous to that for an excise tax on a single
commodity. An excise tax on Xi alone has a welfare cost of
and one on X2 alone has a welfare cost of — This symmetry exists
because a proportional income tax has the same effect on relative prices
as a subsidy to leisure, and the expression — isthe same for a
given absolute value of t,regardlessof whether tisnegative (subsidy)
or positive (tax).
In the above formula, taxes are expressed as percentages of the net
prices (unit costs) of the corresponding commodities. Income-tax rates,
however, are normally expressed as percentages of income before tax.
It is worthwhile to establish at an early stage the relationships involved
in the comparison of income taxes with "equivalent" excise taxes, so
as to avoid confusion later on. A proportional income tax of r per cent
has as its counterpart an excise tax on the net prices of all goods other
than leisure of r/(1 —r)per cent. That is, a 20 per cent income tax
corresponds to an excise tax of 25 per cent on X1 and X2, for this creates
a situation in which the gross prices of X1 andexceed their net prices
by 20 per cent of the gross price. Correspondingly, an income tax has
the same effect on the allocation of resources as a subsidy at the rate
of r/(1 —r)per cent on the net price of leisure. (Recall here that in this
44TAXATION, RESOURCE ALLOCATION, WELFARE
entire analysis we are holding the purchasing power of government
receipts constant,that if leisure were in fact to be subsidized directly
there would have to exist a neutral—say, lump-sum—tax side by side
with the subsidy on leisure so as to produce the required level of govern-
ment receipts.) But a subsidy at the rate of r/(1 —r)per cent on the
net price of leisure is equal to a subsidy of r per cent on the gross price




We can now render in diagrammatic form the expression —
Let LL be the supply curve of labor (defined so as to contain the sub-
stitution effect only). Let w be the prevailing wage, gross of income tax.
Then, where r is the tax rate on gross income rw( AC) is the amount





labor.Nowis th.e derivative of the function for leisure with
respect to the wage rate, so the derivative of the supply function of
labor with respect to the wage rate will be —Saa. Hence the reduction
in the amount of labor performed as a consequence of an income tax
at the rate r will be —S33rw(——BC). The over-all reduction in gross
money income to the worker will be DEBC. But the worker will have
gained leisure valued at DEBA. This leaves as the net welfare cost
of the tax the triangle ABC, or — Recalling that =
thisexpression for welfare cost can be written
19L 1 (rw)2= r2wL=
45
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where eisthe elasticity of supply of labor (expressing the substitution
effect only), wL represents the earnings of labor gross of income tax,
and r represents the rate of income tax expressed in the usual way as a
percentage of gross income.
In order to apply this result to the United States case, we must
first obtain an estimate of e, and then take account of the progressivity
of the actual U.S. income tax. As far as e is concerned, we have fairly
reliable estimates on the secular pattern of response of hours worked
to changes in real wages. Broadly speaking, a 1 per cent rise in real
wages per hour has been associated with a reduction of .25 per cent
in average hours worked.'3 Unfortunately for our purposes, this historical
13Wagesper hour of work in the manufacturing industry rose from $.502 in 1900
to $2.24 in 1957, expressed in 1957 prices (Albert Rees, "Patterns of Wages, Prices,
and Productivity," in Charles Myers, ed., Wages, Prices, Profits, andProductivity,
New York, 1957, Pp. 15—16). Average hours of work per week fell from 55 to 37.8
during the same period.





The elasticity of hours with respect to real hourly wages derived from these data
is —.235.The elasticities obtained from the regression of annual data on these
two variables for the period 1900—57 (excluding the depression and war years)
were —.26for manufacturing, —.26for railroads, —.19for bituminous coal, and
—.21for anthracite coal. (See Ethel B. Jones, "Hours of Work in the United States,
1900—1957," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1961, p. 44.)
Obviously, using these figures to measure the elasticity of labor supply implicitly
assumes that average hours tended to be those "desired" by workers, i.e., that
workers were in some sense "on" their labor supply function. One need not labor
the point that individual workers are constrained to some extent by the norms
adopted in the particular places they work, so that a worker who desired to work
only 30 hours a week would either have to find a job requiring this amount of work
or be "off" his labor supply function. But it seems reasonable to suppose that the
main force behind the historical downward trend in hours was the desire for addi-
tional leisure on the part of the typical worker. Unions would probably not have
negotiated, and employers would probably not have conceded, reductions in normal
hours of work if these reductions were not desired by the workers themselves. By
the same token, there can be little doubt that wage rises were the principal force
motivating the desire for greater leisure on the part of workers. Certainly, legislative
changes do not account for a significant part of the reduction in hours. Laws imposing
maximum hours affected only 4.1 per cent of workers in manufacturing by 1929
(ibid., p. 56). Jones concludes that only the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 is
likely to have had a significant independent effect on hours worked in manufactur-
ing, but finds that by the postwar period, actual hours in manufacturing were slightly
above those which would be predicted by the pre-1929 relationships between average
hours and real wage rates (ibid., p. 70). Actually, the major reductions in hours
in the postwar period have come through increases in vacation and holiday time,
which are unaffected by legislation and which seem to be a highly plausible form
for workers to take increases in their "desired" leisure time.
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relationship reflects both the income effect and the substitution effect
of wage increases. The problem is illustrated in Figure 7. In response
to a rise in real wages, we observe an increase in the amount of leisure





(such as would arise if the lower wage rate remained in effect and the
worker inherited an annuity providing him with GEofincome per
period) plus a substitution effect B'C'(suchas would take place if
simultaneously the worker's annuity were canceled and the wage rate
rose as depicted). Our problem is to guess at the possible magnitude
of the income effect so as to be able to conclude something about the
size of the substitution effect.
To put the problem in terms of the elasticity of supply of labor
directly, let us defineas the partial derivative of labor supply with
respect to the wage rate, when the income effect is included, andas
the corresponding partial derivative when the income effect is excluded.
Letbe the response of labor supply to a change in income (such as
would come with the receipt of an annuity), holding the wage rate
constant. Then we can write:
aL
Now with no other changes taking place, income will change by the
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wi9L .9L so we can set (ay/3w) =L.Hence = or
=e+ w wheree' represents the elasticity of supply of labor in-
cluding income and substitution effects and e represents the elasticity
of supply of labor including the substitution effect only. wis simply
the negative of the fraction of an increase in nonlabor income which is
taken out in the form of leisure. Thus if, for example, a worker on receiv-
ing an annuity of $1,000ayear would reduce his labor earnings by $250
a year, wwould for him be —.25.If he would reduce his labor earnings
by $500 a year, wwould for him be —.50.
Now, from historical observations, we take e' to be —.25.Hence if
wequaled—.25,e must equal zero, and if w=— .50,e must equal
+.25. Since e cannot be negative, and the available evidence indicates
that e' is about —.25,we cannot "guess" that wis less in absolute
magnitude than .25. We can guess, however, that it is substantially
less than .5 in absolute value. In order to have a specific number to
play with, I shall assume that w=— .375,indicating that a typical
worker inheriting an annuity of $1000 will tend to reduce his labor
earnings by $375. Readers need not take this guess too seriously, how-
ever, for the results that will be obtained using it can easily be adjusted
for alternative assumptions.
When measuring the welfare cost of a proportional income tax, we
can use the expression without further ado. But when the tax
system is progressive, we must recognize that the choices of an individual
at the margin are governed by his marginal tax rate, which we can call m.
Lettingbe the marginal tax rate in the ii" tax bracket, and=
be the total wage income earned by people in the jth tax; bracket, we
may express the total welfare cost of the personal income tax as
This is what is done in Tables 2 and 3. It is assumed that
is equal to .125 for all tax brackets, on the basis of the value of —.375
for wselected above. Column 1 of Table 2 is merely for the informa-
tion of the reader. The $331 billion of reported income on returns with
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TABLE2
WELFARE COST PER DOLLAR OF LABOR INCOME, BY
ADJUSTED GROSS INCOME CLASS
Taxable
Income Welfare
Total Per Implied Cost Per
Adjusted Adjusted Return Reduction in Dollar
Gross Gross with Marginal Labor Supply of Labor
Income Income Adjusted Tax Rate Within Class Income
















Less than5 84,278 887 .20 2.50 .0025
5 — 10 144,9134 3,750 .20 2.50 .0025
10 — 15 7,865 .22 2.75 .0030
15 — 20 15,151 12,400 .30 3.75 .0056
20 — 25 7,738 16,906 .34 4.25 .0072
25 — 50 16,594 26,496 .43 5.38 .0116
50 —100 53,659 .62 7.75 .0240
100 —150 2,0].5 96,775 .72 9.00 .0324
150 —200 936 136,488 .78 9.75 .0380
200 —500 1,750 223,392 .89 11.13 .0495
500 —1000 663 528,092 .91 11.38 .0518
Over1000 806 1,480,450 .91 11.38 .0518
Total 330,936
Source:Statistics of Income:Individual Income Tax Returns for 1961,
pp. 14—16.
adjustedgross income compares with $427 billion reported as total
personal income in the national accounts for 1961. Column 2 of Table 2
presents the average adjusted gross income per return with adjusted
gross income in each class. This figure was used to determine the margi-
nal tax rate that would be assumed for each class in the calculations
to follow. In obtaining the marginal tax rate from the tax table, the
rates applying to joint returns were used. Thus a downward bias was
introduced into the calculations of welfare cost. Column 4 of Table 2
presents the percentage reduction in labor effort within each class which
is implied by the assumptions of this analysis. It is meant to be a check
on the plausibility cf the results. As can be seen, the implied reductions
in labor effort range from 2.5 per cent in the 20 per cent bracket to
around 11.4 per cent in the 91 per cent bracket. This says, in effect,
that if it were posthble to extract out of each income class the same tax
as was in fact obtained, but in such a way that tax incentives did not
distort the choice between labor and leisure at the margin, we would
get 11.4 per cent more work out of our top income brackets and 2.5
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TABLE3
WELFARE COST ON WAGES ANt) SALARIES ANDBUSINESSAND
PROFESSIONAL INCOtE, BY GROSS CLASS
Potential
Welfare
Welfare Wage and Business and Cost on
Coat Per Salary ProfessionalBusiness and
Adjusted Dollar of Income inWelfare Cost Income Professional
Gross Labor Taxable on Wage and on Taxable Income
Income Income Returns Salary Income Returns in Class
Class in Class in Class (cola. 1x2) in Class (cola. lx4)











Less than5 .0025 58,418 146 4,371 11
5 — 10 .0025 129,695 324 6,630 17
10 — 15 .0030 40,448 121 3,434 10
15 —20 .0056 9,837 55 2,166 12
20 — 25 .0072 4,145 30 1,468 11
25 — 50 .0116 6,864 80 3,338 39
50 —100 .0240 2,452 59 991 24
100 —150 .0324 546 18 115 4
150 —200 .0380 185 7 33 1
200 —500 .0495 234 12 30 1
500 —1000 .0518 39 2 6 ——
Over1000 .0518 19 1 5 ——
Total 252,882 855 22,587 130
Source:Statistics of Income:Individual Income Tax Returns for 1961,
pp.14—16.
per cent more work out of people presently in the lowest range of taxable
income. These figures do not imply that top-bracket people work less
than low-bracket people, but only that they work 11 or so per cent less
than they would in the absence of the income-tax incentive for leisure.
Much work has still to be done to enrich the theory underlying this
analysis and to check its implications in detail. However, I would sug-
gest the following principal sources of the reduction in labor effort,
particularly in the higher brackets:
1. Longer vacations (winters in Florida, etc.).
2. A higher incidence of early retirement,
3. Less labor force participation of women.
4. Less supplemental labor income from sources other than main
employment.
And I find it quite plausible that these factors might account for a
5 per cent reduction in labor effort in the $25,000—$50,000 bracket, and
for an 11 per cent reduction in the highest brackets, as against what
it would be in the absence of tax incentives at the margin, but in the
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presence of the ex:isting total weight of tax. Needless to say, I do not
expect everybody to agree with this judgment, but shall proceed on this
basis in the absence of any alternative that seems clearly better to me.
Colunm 5 of Table 2 (reproduced as colunm 1 of Table 3) gives the
estimated welfare cost per dollar of labor income in each class. In column
2 of Table 3 we have the amount of wage and salary income (by far
the major category of labor income) declared on taxable returns in each
class, and in column 3 the estimated welfare cost associated with the
tax incentive to wage and salary earners. In column 4 we have the
amount of business and professional income declared on taxable returns
in each class. Obviously not all of this income comes from labor effort,
but the estimates of welfare cost in column 5 are based on the extreme
assumption that business and professional income is all labor income.
Since the welfare costs estimated in column 5 are not large compared
with those in column 3, I elected not to attempt an adjustment to ex-
clude that fraction. of business and professional income which might
be attributable to property.
The results emerging from Table 3 suggest that the welfare costs
associated with the distortion of the labor-leisure choice by the personal
income tax may be of the order of $1 billion per year. My own reaction
to this is twofold. First of all, $1 billion is not a very large amount in
comparison to the $42 billion per year raised by the personal income
tax in 1961. If this were a necessary cost to obtain the kind of progression
that the personal income tax contributes to our tax system, I would
judge it to be a worthwhile cost. But the roughly $1 billion per year
cost estimated in Table 3 is clearly not a necessary cost to obtain the
existing degree of progression in the personal income tax structure.
Actually, the average tax rate (income-tax adjusted-gross-income) does
not reach 45 per cent even for the highest brackets, and for most
brackets is only about half the marginal tax rate.'4 This means that there
are real possibilities for obtaining about as much revenue from each
class as at present, but with lower marginal rates. This can be done by
broadening the tax base (reducing exemptions and deductions, eliminat-
ing or modifying a host of special provisions such as percentage depletion
and capital gains, etc.). Most tax experts have advocated such a reform
14Theaverage tax rates in 1961 by bracket are: 7.2 per cent for 0—$5,000; 11.0 per
cent for $5,000—10,000; 14.3 per cent for $10,000—15,000; 17.0 per cent for $15,000—
20,000; 19.5 per cent for $20,000—25,000; 24.5 per cent for $25,000—50,000; 34.2 per
cent for $50,000—100,000; 40.1 per cent for $100,000—150,000; 42.4 per cent for
$150,000—200,000; 43.7 per cent for $200,000—500,000; 44.8 per cent for $500,000—
1,000,000; and 42.4 per cent for over $1,000,000.
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of our tax system, and the present analysis simply adds support to the
proposal. If, for example, the marginal rate in each class of adjusted
gross income could be reduced to seven-tenths of its present value, the
welfare cost estimated above would be cut about in half. And it is
likely that this could be done without loss of either revenue or effective
progressivity.
IV. Comparison of the Welfare Costs
of Direct and Indirect Taxation
In this section we attempt to assess the relative merits of direct and
indirect taxation taking explicit account of the issues raised by the
labor-leisure choice. Throughout this section we shall set aside the
problem of progressivity and consider the income tax as a proportional
tax, and as equivalent to a set of excise taxes striking all goods other
than leisure at the same percentage rate. The first question we ask is:
Granted that the income tax has a certain welfare cost, under what cir-
cumstances does it have a smaller welfare cost than a set of excise taxes
at unequal rates which yields the same revenue? Second, we turn to the
theoretical question of how to measure the difference in welfare costs
between an excise tax and an income tax yielding the same revenue.
Third, we turn to the more interesting question of how we would meas-
ure the change in welfare costs resulting from eliminating an existing
excise tax and substituting for it an increment to an already existing
income tax.
To answer our first question, let us again postulate a three-com-
modity world, in which the third good is leisure. We are allowed to tax
only goods 1 and 2, and we are required to raise a given amount of
revenue. The expression for welfare cost, when commodity units are
chosen so that unit costs equal 1, is
—
—F- —I— —F- 2,S12t1t2 —F- 2213t1t3 —I—
Because our problem restrictsto be zero, this reduces to
+ S22t2 + 2S12t1t2].
We seek to minimize this expression by our choice of li and t2, subject
to the constraint that t1X1 + t2X2 =K,i.e., that a given amount of total
revenue, K, is obtained. Minimizing
W =— + + 2S12t1t2] + x[t1X1 + —K],
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we obtain
=— lit1—l2t24— A1 =
= —S22t2—31211+ AX2 =0.





Obviously, Li will equal 12 when the numerators of the above expressions
are equal, i.e., when
—X2S12 —_X-1812.
Using the fact that, when unit costs =1,Su =—$12—313;$22 =
— 812—823,this equality can be rewritten
—X1312 X2S12 —XiS23=— —X1S12—..K2S13.
Hence the equality requires that X1823 be equal to X2S13, or that
S13/X1 =823/X2.But Si3 = andwith P3 =1,the cross elasticity
of demand for commodity 1 with respect to the price of leisure can be
written = Likewise,S23/X2 = Hence the condition for
equal excise taxation of both goods being the best pattern of excise
taxation by which to raise a given sum of money is that both goods have
the same cross elasticity of demand with respect to the price of leisure.
To see under what circumstances a minimum welfare cost is obtained
with a lower (or a higher) tax on X1 than X2, we can express the ratio
11/12as:
—xis12 + x2S12+ xis23.
— X1S12 + X2812 + X2$13
Obviously,when X:L$23 is smaller than Li is less than 12. This can
happen when $23 is negative, i.e., when X2 is complementary to leisure,
or when, 823 and 8k3 both being positive, X1S23 < X2S13. This last in-
equality is equivalent to fl23 < '713. Thus the tax on Xi "should" be
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lower than the tax on X2 whenever X2 is less substitutable for leisure
than is X1.15
This result should not be taken to suggest, however, that it is likely
that minimum-welfare-cost patterns of excise taxation are likely to have
very different rates. Dividing both numerator and denominator in the
above expression by X1X2,andrecalling that 812 =821, weobtain:
=fl2i+ '712 + 023
12'721+012+013
If, as is likely, the cross elasticity of both goods with respect to the price
of leisure is low in comparison to the cross elasticities of the goods
with respect to each other's prices, the ratio ofto t2willnot be "very"
different from unity.
We now turn to the second question mentioned at the beginning
of this section—measuring the difference in welfare cost between an
excise tax and an income tax of equal yield. The welfare cost of an
excise tax at the rate t1 is simply
42 '-'1 —
Aproportional income tax at the ratewill have equal yield when
tz(Xi+ X2) = t1X1,i.e., where=t1X1/(X1+ X2). The welfare cost
of this income tax will be
C2=
Hencewe may write
C1— C2 = — S33(tx)2], or
—= [i—
This equation expresses the difference in welfare cost between an excise
tax and an equal-yield income tax as the welfare cost of the excise tax
,, ftx\2
takenby itself times one minus acorrection factor
I I\ti
Nowis simply X1/(X1 + X2), or the fraction of money income
accounted for by the taxed commodity. Calling this measure a1, we
may express the correction factor as {833/(X1 + X2)][X1/811]a1. Now
is simply i/oil. Now, as indicated in the preceding section
isequal to the derivative of the supply of labor with respect to the wage
For an early analysis arriving at essentially the same conclusion, though by a
somewhat more complicated argument, see W. J. Corlett and D. C. Hague, "Corn-
plementarity and the Excess Burden of Taxation," Review of Economic Studies,
1953—54, pp. 21—30.
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(P3). Where all income is produced by labor, and all prices are unity,
(X1 + X2)representsthequantityoflaborsupplied.Therefore
—S33/(X1 + X2) is equal to e,theelasticity of supply of labor. Hence
S
(i-) ] can
be expressed as — Since fluis necessarily
negative, the correction factor is positive. What is more important,
however, is the fact that the correction factor is likely to be very small,
as long as the excise tax is not so general as to be nearly an income tax
itself. In the preceding section we judged a plausible value for etobe
.125. Suppose we consider t1 to be an excise tax which strikes 20 per cent
of all goods and services other than leisure, i.e., .2 =X1/(X1+ X2) =a1.
The correction factor will then be equal to —(.2)(.l25)/flui,or —
Thus if the own-price elasticity of demand for the taxed good were as
small in absolute value as .25, the correction factor would only be .1;
and if the elasticity were in the range between —.5and —1.0,the correc-
tion factor could, for all practical purposes, be neglected. Only when the
elasticity of demand for the excise-taxed commodity is very small indeed
would the correction factor become of sizable magnitude. And this
elasticity would have to be virtually zero (in our example, less than .025)
in order for the correction factor to exceed unity, and thus for the excise
tax to have lower welfare cost than an equal-yield income tax.
The result just obtained is heartening to those who felt all along that
direct taxation is better than indirect taxation. But the case just covered
is one in which the excise tax and the income tax are strictly alternatives,
and as such it is far removed from reality. We shall now modify the
preceding example to allow for an income tax already in existence, and
shall inquire about the size of the difference between the increments
to welfare cost incurred by either adding a given amount to total revenue
by way of an excise tax on X1, or adding the same amount to total
revenue by increasing the rate of income tax.
Let t0 be the existing rate of income tax, and, as before ti andbe
the alternative increments to tax rates. The situations we are comparing
then are
Tax Rate on X1 Tax Rate on X2
Situation 1 t0 + t1
Situation 2 t0 + ix t0 + ix,
where, as before,= a1t1.
The expressions for the welfare cost are in this case most conveniently
expressed in terms of the third fundamental form —
ji<i
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C1 = + 813(to —F- t1)2+
C2 = + tz)2 + S23(t0 + tz)2].
Expanding, we have
C1. = + + 2813t0e1 ++
C2 = + 2513t0tz + ,S13(tx)2 ++ + 823(tz)2].
Subtracting,we obtain
C.1 —C2= -1— 2,S13t0t1 + —2S13totx—
— 2823t0tx—823(tx)2].
Since 812+813= — Sii,and —813 — 823 = this reduces to
C1 —C2 -4— -4— 2813t0t1 —2813t0tz—2S23totz]
Substituting a1t1 forinthe last two terms, we have
C1 —C2= -4— 4- 2(1 —aj)iSiatoti—2aiS23tot1].
— 2r ftx\2 (1 —a1)iS13to a1823to
Ci —C2— Siitii1 — p—2
L \ti/
Onceagain we are expressing the difference in the welfare cost of an
excise tax and (in this case) an increment to the income tax rate as
being equal to the welfare cost of the excise tax by itself times one
minus a correction factor. For simplicity, let us say one minus two
S correction factors. The first of these, hasalready been shown
to be equal to —aie/flii,and likely to be small.
We therefore turn to an evaluation of the second correction factor,
2.
(1—ai)S13—ajS23 First let us convert this relationship into





Now let us define a2 =X2/(X1+ X2) =(1—ai).Dividing numerator




The correction factor will be positive if the taxed commodity (X1) is
complementary with leisure<0), or if, both goods being substitutes
for leisure, the taxed commodity is the poorer substitute (0 < n,a < 7723).
This simply reflects the fact that the minimum-welfare-cost pattern of
taxing Xi and X2 calls for higher taxation of the poorer substitute for
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leisure. But it is to be emphasized that the sign of the second correction
factor could be either positive or negative, and that neither sign is
more likely than the other. The sign depends only on whether the com-
modity chosen for excise taxation happens to be a better-than-average
or a worse-than-average substitute for leisure.
It is to be presumed that in most cases the second adjustment factor
will be of small magnitude, at least where the tax rate ti is not very
small in relation to the existing income tax rate, to,andwhere the own-
price elasticity of demand for X1 is not itself very small.






Since813 + 823 = and mustadd up to —1. In the
813 823 normal case where X1 and X2 are both substitutes for leisure, and
will both be negative fractions. Calling them 1' and 12 respectively, the
second correction factor can be rewritten as
2.(a2fi —aif2)silt'
(833t0/S11t1) is simply the ratio of the welfare cost per dollar of tax receipts
of the existing income tax to the welfare cost per dollar of tax receipts
of the excise tax under consideration, divided by a1, the share of the
taxed commodity in total income. The welfare cost of the income tax is
= + The revenue from theincome taxis
(X1 + X2)t0, as the welfare cost per dollar of revenue is The welfare
cost of the excise tax on X1, in turn, is = It yields
X1t1 in revenue, so the welfare cost per dollar of tax is — Hence
if we call h0 and h, the welfare costs per dollar of revenue of the existing
income tax and the excise tax under consideration, respectively, we can
write (833t0/811t1) =ho/aih1.Hence the correction factor is equal to
2([a2fj/al] —f2)(h0/h1).
Where the welfare cost per dollar of revenue is significantly higher for
the excise tax than for the existing income tax, the correction factor is
likely to be small. When e =.125,the welfare cost of an income tax,
per dollar of revenue, will range between $.0125 and $.0250 for tax rates
between .2 and .4, for example. When=—1,on the other hand, the
welfare cost of an excise tax of 20 per cent will be $.1Operdollar of tax
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revenue. Thus where an excise tax is likely to look bad (i.e., to have a
high welfare cost per dollar of tax revenue) when taken by itself, it is
also likely to look bad in comparison with the alternative of adding to an
existing income tax. When, on the other hand, an excise tax is con-
templated which does not look bad by itself, we cannot be confident
that an increase in income tax designed to produce an equal increment
of revenue would be a preferable alternative.
The conclusion that I draw from this exercise is, therefore, that by
and large the traditional preference for direct over indirect taxation is
justified, and that the simple textbook measure of welfare cost (the
triangle under the demand curve) yields a good first approximation
in most cases.
V. Taxation andtheIncentive to Save
We now turn to a consideration of how taxation influences welfare
through its effect on saving. Here we have another area where income
taxation is nonneutral. The private incentives to save are governed by
the after-tax yield on the sums involved, but the social rate of return
is given by the before-tax yield. Clearly, in order to make the tax system
neutral with respect to savings decisions, one would require a consump-
tion tax of the type that Kaldor has proposed, rather than an income
tax of the conventional type.
Having recognized the nonneutrality of income taxation with respect
to savings, we now turn to the measurement of the welfare costs that
it entails. The solution to this problem is not as clear-cut as that of
labor-leisure choice. The difficulty arises because the introduction of
savings into the picture injects a dynamic element into what would
otherwise be a comparative static model. This can be handled neatly
if the time path of savings is independent of the changes in tax policy
under consideration, but in such a case income taxation would have
no welfare cost arising from interference with the savings decision, and
our problem would disappear. As long as we take our problem seriously,
we must face up to a possible effect of taxation on the volume of savings
and investment, and thus the problem of incorporating a dynamic ele-
ment in what would otherwise be a static model must be faced.
I shall discuss here two alternative ways of dealing with the above
problem, the first of which inquires into the purpose for which the saving
in question is undertaken, and the second of which does not. The first
approach starts by taking a particular time-horizon for a given act of
saving—say, ten years. If $1 is saved now, and if its full social yield
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(at the rate p) is reinvested, it will produce, ten years from now, a sum
equal to $1 (1 + p)10.If,however, the yield of this saving is annually
taxed at the ratet,its private value ten years from now will be
$1(1 + r)10,ifr= p(l—t)is the private rate of return on savings. The
marginal rate of substitution in consumption between present goods
and goods ten years in the future will therefore be 1: (1 + r)10, whilethe
social marginal rate of transformation will be 1: (1 + p)Theper-
centage excess of (1 + p)'° over (1 + r)1°playsthe same role as would
a tax of this percentage on savings made for the purpose of accumulation
for ten years and for consumption at the end of the period. Similarly,
the percentage excess of (1 + p)fl over (1 +playsthe same role as a
corresponding tax on savings made for the purpose of accumulation for
n.yearsand then for consumption. Since inthereal world savings are
not made for purposes as clearly specified as these, one may regard the
effects of income taxation as being equivalent to a tax on savings at a rate
equal to a weighted average of the expressions [(1 + + 1],
the weights reflect:Lng the probabilities attaching to the savings being
used in particular future time periods.
The approach just outlined has the advantage of emphasizing the way
in which the effects of tax incentives upon saving depend on what might
be called the savings strategy of the affected individuals. The marginal
rate of substitution between this year's goods and next year's goods is
not likely to be much affected even by very heavy income taxation;
while the marginal rate of substitution between this year's goods and
goods a quarter century from now will be substantially affected, even
by comparatively moderate income taxation. For example, taxing away
50 per cent of the income from capital, in a case where p, the social
marginal productivity of capital, is 6 per cent, changes the marginal
rate of substitution between present and future goods from 1.06to1.03
for one-year savings decisions, from 1.34 to 1.16 for five-year savings
decisions, from to 1.34 for ten-year savings decisions, and from 3.21
to 1.81 for twenty-year savings decisions. But by the same token, this
approach runs into the difficulty of having to specify the savers' strate-
gies with respect to reinvestment and consumption out of capital.
The second approach is simpler, neater, and more conventional. It
simply regards each dollar saved as purchasing a perpetual income
stream in the amount of $p per year for the society as a whole, and of
$p(l —t),or $rperyear for the individual saver. The present value
of this income stream to the saver, evaluated at the rate r,is$1. But the
present value to society is $p/r.Thesocial value of a marginal dollar of
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saving thus exceeds the private value by the percentage t/ (1 —t).If
the elimination of this distortion would produce a change in savings
equal todollars, then we can assign as the welfare cost of the dis-
tortion of the savings decision the amount —t)].
I must confess that I have labored for some time under a prejudice
against this second approach, mainly because the idea of persons con-
sidering saving only in terms of perpetuities did not seem particularly
realistic. However, further reflection has led me to conclude that my
original objection was not a serious one. The essential difference between
the two approaches lies in their treatment of decisions taken at different
times. The first approach tries to deal simultaneously with the saving
that takes place now, with the reinvestment of the earnings of that sav-
ing for some period in the future, and with the disinvestment of the
accumulated value at the end of the period. The second approach deals
only with the savings decisions taken at a given period in time. This
year's savings are considered when the analysis focuses on this year's
actions; next year's savings are taken into account when the analysis
focuses on next year's actions, etc. In particular, the second approach
does not ask what will be done next year with the earnings on this
year's savings; it simply treats those earnings as part of the total income
accruing next year, in terms of which the individual will reach a decision
as to how much to save. Nor does the second approach treat the realiza-
tion of the proceeds of a given investment as an act of dissaving; it
looks instead at the total movement in the capital stock of an individual
in a given year. If this capital stock has increased, the individual has
saved, net, regardless of how many previous investments may have been
liquidated during the year. It seems to me, therefore, that the second
approach, in addition to being simpler and more convenient to handle
in the analysis of welfare costs, also looks at the savings decision in a
scientifically more sophisticated way.
Before leaving the subject of the effects of taxation on the rate of
saving, we should inquire whether the distortions introduced by income
taxation can lead to an increase in the rate of saving. It is well known
that where changes in the rate of return on savings include an income
effect, a reduction in the rate of return can produce an increase in the
volume of savings. Does this possibility emerge in the case under dis-
cussion? The answer, I believe, is clearly negative. Income effects are
kept out of the picture, in this analysis, by the requirement that the
government be able, year by year, to buy the same bundles of goods
under any alternative patterns of taxation being compared. If we were
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to consider the effects of reducing the rate of income taxation, without
imposing any alternative tax to make up for the lost revenue, then an
income effect woulld be present, and a decrease in saving could con-
ceivably result. However, if we require that the government make up
for the lost revenue, say, by increasing the rate of consumption taxation,
then no first-order income effect will be present, and the change in the
rate of savings must be in the same direction as the change in the net-of-
tax rate of return.
Consumers in their role as savers see their future income reduced
because of the tax that they have to pay on the return to capital under
an income tax. But if the shift were made to a pure consumption tax,
they would see their future income reduced because of the higher tax they
would have to pay on their future consumption expenditures.'6 Con-
sumers will in fact get more future income under a consumption-tax
setup than under an equal-yield income tax, but they will do so only
because they save more as a consequence of the higher return they per-
ceive on their capital. If they save exactly the same amounts under the
two setups, the extra future income they get from their capital will be
just counterbalanced by the extra future taxes they have to pay on their
consumption when they face a consumption rather than an income tax.
In spite of a clear presumption that the taxation of income from
property will reduce the rate of savings as against what it would be
under neutral taxation of equal yield, it is very hard to build an empirical
case for the proposition that the taxation of property income has sig-
nificantly affected the savings rate. But one must recognize that it
would not require a phenomenal responsiveness of savings to the net
rate of return in order to generate a fairly significant welfare cost as a
consequence of the distortion of the savings-consumption decision. If
net savings, for example, were only 1 per cent of the national income less
than they would be under straight consumption taxation, the welfare
cost of taxes striking the income from capital at a per cent rate
would be roughly times the national income. This is .25 per
cent of national income, or a sum of over $1 billion per year at present
levels.
What rankles me much more than the possible effect of our tax system
on the total volume of savings, however, is the way in which our taxes
influence the uses to which our savings are put. The heavy weight of
taxes on income from capital can be justified on equity grounds in a
16SeeMartin 3. Bailey, National Income andthePrice Level, New York, 1962,
pp. 180—182.
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number of ways, but the grossly unequal tax treatment of different
types of income from capital cannot be seriously defended by appeals
to equity considerations. Most risky corporate investments, which have
little chance to be financed by debt capital, have the worst of it, while
oil wells are powerfully subsidized to produce petroleum at real cost far
above what it would take to obtain the oil from abroad. Income is freely
transmuted into capital gains in a variety of activities (lumber, coal
mining, rental housing, cattle feeding), inducing an excessive flow of
resources into these fields. Perhaps the most blatant case is that of
owner-occupied housing which is allowed to generate no taxable income,
just tax deductions. The stimuli given by the tax treatment of owner-
occupied housing are virtually nil for the needy, and increase directly
with the opulence of the taxpayer. It is easy to establish that these tax
incentives give rise to a substantial misallocation of investible funds,
with a consequent cost to consumers throughout the economy. Else-
where'7 I have tried to establish the order of magnitude of the losses
involved due to tax-induced misallocations of our capital stock. Roughly
speaking, $1 billion per year (say, between $.5 and $1.5 billion) seems
to be the right order of magnitude for the distortions caused by the
corporation income tax. Percentage depletion and related provisions
appear to cost the economy between $.5 and $L0 billion per year.
David Laidler, in a study currently nearing completion, estimates the
cost to the economy of the inefficiencies introduced by the special treat-
ment of owner-occupied housing to be in the order of $.5 to $1.0 billion
per year. Taking all these costs together, and recognizing that there are
a number of important tax incentives to the allocation of investment
which are not accounted for above, I think that a clear case can be
made for rationalizing our manner of taxing income from capital so as
not to discriminate so severely among different allocations of capital
resources.
VI. Taxation and Growth
It is likely that the feature which best distinguishes the economic think-
ing (both professional and popular) of the postwar period from earlier
decades is the emphasis placed upon economic growth—as a phenomenon
to be explained, as a criterion of economic performance, and as an ob-
ArnoldC. Harberger, "The Taxation of Mineral Industries," in Federal Tax
Policy for Economic Growth and Stability, Washington, Joint Committee on the
Economic Report, 1955, pp. 439—49, and "The Corporation Income Tax: An Em-
pirical Appraisal," in Tax Revision Compendium, U.S. of Representatives,
Ways and Means Committee, Washington, 1959.
62TAXATiON, RESOURCE ALLOCATION, WELFARE
jective of policy. In today's environment it is quite natural, therefore, to
inquire into the likely effects of alternative policies upon the rate of
growth. In the terms of reference of this conference, and of my paper,
this boils down to the question of how significantly the rate of growth
could be influenced by plausible changes in the mix of direct and indirect
taxation. I think that the answer is not very much.
The modern approach to the empirical analysis of economic growth
(used, with only slight variations, by Abramovitz, Denison, Fabricant,
Kendrick, Schultz, and Solow, among others) is to split up observed
growth into a part attributed to the increase in labor inputs, a part
attributed to the increase in capital inputs, and a residual not explained
by these factors. The part assigned to labor is this year's growth in
man-hours times last year's average wage; this procedure uses last year's
average wage as a measure of what the marginal product of the added
labor would be in the absence of technical progress and of changes in
the quality of labor. The part assigned to capital is this year's net
investment times last year's average before-tax rate of return to capital;
once again last year's observed rate of return is used as a measure of
what added capital would contribute to national income in the absence
of technical advance and other forces not taken directly into account.
The breakdown of the change in output from one period (year) to the
next can be summarized as:
= + Pt—lIt—i +where
=changeof national income (or net national product) between
period t —1and period t (expressed in dollars of t —1).
=changein labor input (man-hours) between period t —1and
period t.
tOt_i =averagewage per man-hour in period t —1.
Pt—i =average(gross-of-tax) rate of productivity of capital (net of
depreciation.) in period I —1.
=netinvestment in period t —1.
Tg =theamount of growth of national income between I —1and I
which is unexplained by changes in labor and capital inputs
(expressed in dollars of t1).
The formula above can be divided by so as to express the depend-
ency of the rate of growth of income on various factors:
= + +where
= = rateof growth of income in year I.
I
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. = - = shareof labor in the national income in year t —1. I
it= = rateof growth of labor input in year 1.
= = rateof net investment in year t —1.
= = percentageincrease in income in year t which is un-
explained by changes in labor and capital inputs.
The earlier sections of this paper were devoted to the possible effects
of direct and indirect taxation on the supply of labor and on the volume
of savings. There is a clear presumption that greater resort to indirect
taxation would increase the supply of labor, though the magnitude of
the increase would not be very great. The rough guesses of colunm 4
of Table 2 suggest that approximately a 3 per cent increase in the supply
of labor could be obtained by eliminating the inducements to leisure
implied by our present marginal personal income-tax rates. But to get
to this result in practice would require constructing a tax system in which
there were no inducements favoring leisure over labor at the margin.
The more likely alternatives to our present income-tax structure, such
as greater reliance on broad-based indirect taxes, would not go this far;
they would oniy reduce, not eliminate, the incentives toward leisure
at the margin. Thus we should probably think of plausible shifts toward
more indirect taxation as leading to a substantially less than 3 per cent
increase in the supply of labor, under given conditions. This change in
the supply of labor would increase the measured national output (as-
suming full employment), but would not necessarily contribute to the
normal rate of growth of output. Any contribution of decreased leisure
to the rate of growth of output would have to come from its influence
either on the rate of growth of the labor supply or on the share of labor
in total income. I see no reason to expect any significant change in
either of these magnitudes as a consequence of shifting the mix of direct
and indirect taxation;18 hence I would put down as negligible the possible
contribution of such shifts to the over-all rate of growth.
As distinct from their influence on growth via the labor-leisure choice,
there are more significant possibilities for shifts between direct and in-
18Itis clearly possible to influence the long-run rate of growth of the labor force
by tax measures explicitly aimed at this objective. I have no doubt, for example,
that the birth rate could be influenced by changes in income-tax exemption policy,
or by indirect taxes on goods specific to child-raising. And any change in the birth
rate would in the long run have its effect on the normal rate of growth of the labor
force. But I do not believe that any of us consider specific measures aimed at influ-
encing population growth to be within the terms of reference of this conference, and
accordingly will not pursue the matter further.
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direct taxation to alter the rate of growth via their effects on saving.
These can be conveniently represented if we make the assumption that,
through time, the marginal rate of productivity of capital remains
constant. If this rate is 10 per cent, and net investment (=netsavings)
increases from 8 to 9 per cent of the national income, the rate of growth
of output should on that account change by .10 per cent per annum
(.10) X (.01). Increasing the rate of net saving from 8 to 10 per cent
of the national income will, in these circumstances, add .20 per cent
per annum to the rate of growth.
Influencing the rate of growth by .10 or .20 of a percentage point may
seem small, but it is not negligible in the sense that I have labeled the
impact on growth via the labor-leisure choice as negligible. In discussing
the effects on growth via savings, I shall first consider what kinds of
effects on savings we might plausibly expect to come even from drastic
changes in tax policy, and then proceed to deal with the possibility that
the formulation of the growth process presented above might understate
the contribution of added savings.
Although there has been some debate as to the degree to which the
marginal propensity to save increases with income, I believe that there
can be little doubt that it does increase. Existing studies of saving by
income class do not include accruing capital gains either as part of
income or as part of saving, yet in principle they should do both. Thus
studies measuring income and savings on the conventional basis can
yield what purports to be a constant marginal propensity to save, or only
a mildly increasing one, and yet a correctly measured marginal pro-
pensity to save m:ight be a significantly increasing function of income.
As far as I know, no study exists which incorporates accruing capital
gains in both income and savings; hence I cannot bring evidence to
bear on this subject. But making extreme assumptions often allows one
to get an idea of the possibilities. Suppose, for example, that the mar-
ginal propensity to save were 50 per cent for all incomes above $20,000
per year, and 10 per cent for all incomes below $20,000. Suppose, more-
over, that in a drastic tax revolution all incomes above $20,000 were
entirely relieved of income tax, and that the entire income-tax burden
now borne by them were placed (via direct or indirect taxation) on
income brackets below $20,000. What would be the effect on savings?
In 1961, adjusted gross incomes above $20,000 paid less than $11 billion
of income tax. If these groups were relieved of this burden altogether,
they would, on our absurd assumptions, save $5.5 billion more. And if
lower brackets were required to bear $11 billion more of tax, they would,
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on our assumptions, save $1.1 billion less. There would be a net increase
in savings of $4.4 billion, or just about 1 per cent of the 1961 national
income.
Now I cannot imagine that plausible redistributions in the tax burden
would be nearly so drastic as that assumed above. Nor do I find it
plausible that differences in marginal propensities to consume are as
sharp as those assumed above. Hence I conclude that the redistributive
effects associated with plausible tax changes are not likely to increase
saving by more than, say, .50 per cent of the national income.
The evidence we have on the substitution effects of taxation upon
saving is even less secure than that on the redistributive effects. Here,
appeal is often made to the observed secular constancy of the ratio
of savings to income, and the conclusion is drawn, in the face of fairly
substantial changes in the perceived rate of return, that the substitution
effects in question are small. I adhere in general to this position, though
it must be recognized that income effects were also present in the situa-
tions producing the observed data. Until we can isolate the magnitude
of the income effects that were at work, we should not conclude that the
substitution effects which operated to roughly offset the income effects
were minor in importance. Having said this, however, let me add that
I would be surprised if plausible tax changes (e.g., a shift from income to
expenditures as the base of our major progressive tax) would increase
national savings by more than 1, 1.5, or 2 per cent of the national income.
If these rough judgments can be accepted, we must face the fact that
tax changes are unlikely to increase the rate of growth of national income
by more than .10 or .20 of a percentage point—unless the model set out
at the beginning of this section has a serious flaw.
The flaw which would be the most likely to change the growth-rate
implications of the preceding analysis would be an underestimation of
the social marginal productivity of investment (=savings).If invest-
ment carries with it positive external effects on output, the average
perceived gross-of-tax rate of return would understate the contribution
of investment to the growth of national income, and our imputation
would understate the part of observed growth due to capital accumula-
tion.
Solow, in a highly original paper, has attempted to cope with this
possibility by requiring that technical advances be "embodied" in capital
equipment before they produce increases in output.'9 His method was to
19R.M. Solow, "Technical Progress, Capital Formation, and Economic Growth,"
American Economic Review, May 1062, pp. 76—86.
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assume that the capital equipment produced in year t was bOXpercent
"better"(i.e., more productive) than that produced in year t —1.
Working with this assumption, Solow reconstituted existing data making
gross investment in year t "equivalent" to that of the base year by taking
= + A)whereis the conventional measure of gross invest-
ment (in constant dollars) andis the measure incorporating the
improved productivity of investment in year t over the same constant-
dollar volume of investment in year 0. Proceeding on this basis, Solow
builds up a time series on capital stock from the adjusted gross invest-
ment data, together with retirement estimates based on Terborgh's
figures. He estimates separate capital stocks for plant and equipment,
introducing the possibility of separate X's for these two categories of
capital. He ends up with one series for capital stock associated with X's
of .02 for both plant and equipment; another associated with X's of .03
for both plant and equipment, andothree more for other combinations
(.02, .03), (.02, .04), (.03, .04) of X's for plant and equipment. He then
introduces these alternative measures of capital stock along with varia-
bles measuring labor input and unemployment, into a production func-
tion of the Cobb-Douglas type (modified to incorporate the unemploy-
ment variables). His results improve as he moves from capital stock
estimates based on lower values for A to those based on higher values.
Solow's device appears to yield some mileage, as far as the effect of
investment on growth is concerned. Whereas on our assumption of a
10 per cent rate of productivity on capital, it takes a 10 percentage point
increase in the fraction of income invested to produce a 1 percentage
point change in the growth rate, Solow achieves the same effect by
increase of 2.5 percentage points in the fraction of income invested.
However, results depend critically on his assumption that
there are no independent forces producing economic Eitan
Berglas, in a recently completed study, has followed Solow's procedure
for calculating capital stock, but has allowed for the production function
to shift with time as a result of independent forces as well.20 Bergias
finds that the best explanation of observed changes in output, under
this hypothesis, emerges when the X's for plant and equipment are both
set at zero—i.e., when the conventional measure of capital stock is used.
More important, as long as a trend shift of production functions is
allowed for, the effect of investment on output is no greater when A is
high than when it is zero. That is, adjusting the capital stock to incor-
20EitanBergias, "Stimulating Investment: Costs and Effects," unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Chicago, 1963, Chapter 5.
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porate assumed rates of technical improvement does not add to the
estimated effect of investment on economic growth—regardless of what
positive values of A are chosen.
It seems to me that Bergias' reformulation of Solow's procedure must
be preferred to the original. In the first place, we know that there are
forces which have had a trend influence on total factor productivity in
the economy that are not directly associated with the volume of invest-
ment—improvements in the quality of the labor force and advances
in the art of management are two cases in point. This knowledge should
dictate a procedure which would allow for a trend shift of production
functions as one of the explanatory factors of changes in output. If,
when trend shifts were allowed for, they proved to have an insignificant
explanatory power, we could conclude that they have been unimportant.
But this is not the result that emerges. In fact, the trend variables
introduced by Berglas are highly significant statistically (with t ratios
lying between 8 and 15 for various assumptions regarding A). Moreover,
they lead to plausible coefficients for the capital input in the Cobb-
Douglas production function (around .25 for A =0,as opposed to 1.31
for A0 when trend is not taken into account, and .52 for A =.03
when trend is not taken into account). I want to emphasize that, though
Bergias' study suggests that A =0is the best hypothesis for explaining
observed changes in output in the presence of a trend shift in production
functions, this is not the real lesson to be learned from his experiments.
For A =.03,when trend is allowed for, Bergias explains 99.31 per cent
of variations in output per man-hour over the period 1929—60; while
for A0 he explains 99.46 per cent of the same variations. There is
thus not much basis for choice among different plausible values of A.
The important result emerging from Berglas' study is that higher values
of A do not mean that investment has a greater influence on economic
growth than is obtained when A is assumed to be zero. In short, Berglas'
work has put us .back into the situation where an extra percentage point
of national income devoted to investment will affect the rate of growth
by around .10 of a percentage point.
Bergias' conclusions are fortified by additional experiments. In the
first, an effort was made to see whether the rate of growth depended
significantly on the "newness" of the capital stock. To test this hy-
pothesis, the cumulated gross investment of a period, expressed as a
percentage of initial capital stock, is used to explain changes in total
factor productivity over the same period in different industries. This
was done for thirteen two-digit industries, for the periods 1948—57,
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1948—53, and 1953—57. In none of these cases did a significant correla-
tion appear, and in two of the three (1948—57 and 1953—57) the correla-
tion was mildly negative. Similar results emerged when cumulated
investment for 1948—53, expressed as a fraction of capital stock, was
used to explain changes in total factor productivity between 1953 and
1957. This last effort was an attempt to allow for a possible lag between
investment and subsequent improvement in total factor productivity.
The limited power of added investment to improve the growth rate
should not really be surprising. It does not deny that, each year, tech-
nical advances make particular investments highly productive. Nor
does it imply that the allocations presented at the beginning of this
section are correct. I suspect, in fact, that there is a substantial degree
of "embodiment" of technical advances in particular types of capital
goods with high p:rospective marginal productivity. Each year, I think,
technical improvements create prospects of very high rates of return
in certain investments, say, 30, 25, or 20 per cent. The contribution
of these investments to economic growth is greater than p,theaverage
observed rate of return to capital. If we ranked investments according
to prospective rates of return, forming a function I =f(p) where
f' (p)<0, we could state the contribution of investment to economic
growth as Ipotf(p)dp, which would exceed the amount assigned
to investment by the expression where = P0. Thedifference
would be that inframarginal investments would then be assigned a
greater contribution to economic progress. But, when we are talking
about increasing the growth rate by adding to investment, we are not
concerned with inframarginal investments, but about those beyond what
would otherwise be the cut-off rate of return. There is nothing incon-
sistent between the following three statements:
1. Each year some investments are undertaken which promise to
yield, at prevailing prices, very high rates of return.
2. Each year significant amounts of investment are undertaken which
promise yields in the neighborhood of the observed past rate of return.
3. Additional investments above and beyond those actually under-
taken would likely produce rates of return which are at best equal to
the observed past average rate of return.
According to the point of view just expressed, "embodiment" of tech-
nical changes takes place principally in inframarginal investments. This
sort of phenomenon could easily produce the results observed by Berglas,
with the marginal effect of investment being approximated by the ob-
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served past average rate of return, but with a substantial time trend
in the ratio of output to total input. It is also consistent with the obser-
vation that, across industries or time periods, there is relatively little
relationship between the rate of increase in capital stock and the move-
ments in total factor productivity.
This is not the place for a very detailed discussion of these points,
so I will leave the matter here. I hope I have been able to provide
some support for my view that we cannot expect great changes in the
growth rate from plausible changes in the mix of direct and indirect
taxation.
I feel impelled, however, to point out that in our recent preoccupation
with the rate of growth, we, as a profession, may have lost sight of some
old and fundamental truths. We should distinguish between the rate
of growth of income, the level of income, and the level of welfare as
possible goals of economic policy. Concentration on the rate of growth
as an objective can lead one to minimize the value of having, say, x
per cent more income each year as a result of a policy change—simply
because income would not grow any faster except during a transitional
period. On the other hand, concentration on the level of real income (as
conventionally measured) can lead one to neglect the costs of bringing
about changes in that level. If, by tax changes, we increase labor and
reduce leisure, or if we increase saving and reduce consumption, we
should, I think, not just look at the pluses and neglect the minuses.
When we try to take both pluses and minuses into account, we come to
grips with the measurement of the effects of policy changes on welfare,
which was the subject of the earlier sections of this paper.
COMMENT
E. CARY BROWN, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
and University of Chicago
After reading through the major papers prepared for this conference,
I was impressed by the near unanimity of emphasis on two matters.
The first was that the labels direct and indirect taxation are neither
very enlightening nor very helpful in analyzing questions of fiscal policy.
May I fashionably record my full agreement with this view. The second
was the extended analysis given to value-added taxation. My thought
was that we might more accurately have called this the value-added tax
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conference. And I am hopeful that, by the end of it, we will have added
some value to the economy.
WELFARE AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION
Let me turn then to the rigorous analysis Harberger has made of the
welfare and resource-allocation implications of income and excise taxes
for economic growth. At the heart of the problem of growth is, of course,
the concern with economic welfare, and Harberger has properly drawn
our attention to it repeatedly and pressed for quantitative measurement
of it. His discussion shows clearly that there are no easy answers, that
any feasible tax is inefficient in that it involves dead-weight losses, and
that there may be a mild advantage in direct over indirect (really income
over excise) taxes.
I certainly cannot disagree with these views. But it may be well to
re-emphasize the he placed on his analysis: (1) that resources
are fully employed and (I would add, as I am sure he would) efficiently
employed in production; (2) constant government expenditures; (3) con-
stant unit costs; a.nd (4) no redistribution of income. The first assump-
tion is clearly necessary to keep the welfare costs of unemployment
out of the picture. The second one, while necessary for measuring the
welfare costs of alternative taxes, may require relaxation in discussing
problems of growth, as we shall see presently. The third is a justifiable
simplification; it can be relaxed without damaging the analysis. The
fourth—that income is not redistributed—may well be the most awk-
ward. It makes the pioblem the rather unrealistic one of raisin.g a given
amount of revenue from a particular taxpayer by alternative fiscal de-
vices. If we were all endowed with equal incomes and tastes, this ap-
proach would obviously be meaningful. But any conceivable shift in the
tax structure involves some redistribution of income, and when this
arises no measure of welfare loss or gain can be made without making
interpersonal welfare comparisons either explicitly or implicitly.
Besides these strictures, we should always bear in mind two additional
sets of problems. Marginal rates of transformation and substitution can
differ far a variety of reasons other than the kind of tax imposed. It has
often been pointed out in the literature that an excise tax on commodi-
ties produced under purely competitive conditions may actually increase
welfare when one product is monopolized, compared with a completely
neutral tax system. Or, put in another way, we must start from the best
position. Last, but not least, we are ultimately interested in equating
marginal social costs and marginal social benefits. We cannot avoid
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making comparisons of social costs and social benefits; we cannot adopt
the easy assumption that private costs and benefits stand for their social
equivalents. It may be that some distortions in private resource use
created by taxation meet more closely with society's wishes than com-
plete neutrality would. Here, again, it is difficult to say anything quan-
titatively, but just such a question lies at the heart of the issue of
whether more economic growth, for example, will increase the commu-
nity's welfare, especially if bought at any cost.
Some of these difficulties are seen when we attempt to measure the
welfare losses of taxes that distort savings-consuming decisions. They
arise not oniy in a comparison of consumption versus income taxes, but
also in determining the mix between monetary and fiscal policy. To rule
out the tax question, suppose that the government can impose lump-sum
taxes in whatever amount it wishes. Suppose also that there are dimin-
ishing returns to capital, that investment has a negative substitution
response to interest rates, and that consumption, to the extent that it
responds, does so in the same way. Suppose also that the size of the
budget deficit or surplus is a matter of indifference, but that real gov-
ernment expenditures are fixed. We can then visualize an infinite num-
ber of combinations of lump-sum taxes and interest rates that will keep
us on the production-possibility frontier. At any one interest rate and
tax level, consumers will make savings decisions that will change their
lifetime configuration of consumption compared with some other com-
bination. Because there would be no difference between marginal rates
of transformation and substitution of present and future goods, would
each of these positions yield the same welfare? And if one could be
reached by some combination of taxes which included an income tax,
should we then say there was a welfare loss in that position compared
with another?
The problem of optimal rates of saving raises difficult and perplexing
questions, as Harberger has amply emphasized. His approach to meas-
uring the welfare loss is certainly ingenious and interesting. While abid-
ing by his strictures, however, I would measure the loss in a slightly
different way. I would sum up the present values of the welfare costs
arising from changes in consumption over time using some weighting
procedure similar to his, but I would discount them to the present. In
comparing welfare losses of excise taxes, for example, we are comparing
present consumption of one type with present consumption of another.
In the consumption-saving case, we are adding up present and future
welfare losses. To add them up, it seems to me, requires that they be
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made homogeneous by a discounting procedure. Otherwise we would
get infinite welfare losses for those who save permanently. The proper
discount rate to use is certainly debatable: should it be society's marginal
product from saving or the private marginal product? I lean toward
using the after-tax interest rate, rather than the before-tax rate, be-
cause this is the rate seen by the consumer. This comes very close to
Harberger's formulation, but puts it in present-value terms.
To conclude then on welfare matters, I would not want to leave the
impression that I think that they are unimportant. On the contrary,
taxes do create dead-weight losses which we should seek out and correct
wherever we can. The work that Harberger has undertaken is a signifi-
cant contribution toward an understanding of these problems. But it
can only be the first step toward appraising the welfare implications of
taxation, because of the problems of income redistribution and exter-
nalities.
GROWTH
I turn now to the question of economic growth. About this Harberger
has much less to say; but I would agree with his position, as I under-
stand it. The (disembodied) Solow and Denison have shown that the
job of increasing the growth rate by increasing investment is difficult
indeed; and while the (embodied) Solow has given us more hope, it is
not an easy task. It requires large changes in rates of saving and invest-
ing, in labor force participation, or in productivity changes to step up
the rate very much. This is not to say that small changes are insignifi-
cant and unimportant, but we cannot expect major changes without
major revisions in economic policy.
Broadly speaking, revisions in tax policy can be classified into three
categories: structural changes that leave the distribution of income
alone; structural changes that also redistribute income; and structural
changes that increase the level of taxation, holding government expendi-
tures constant—that is, that alter the full-employment surplus or deficit.
The analysis that economists have brought to bear on the first kind
of change generally suggests that no major results would flow from a
shift toward indirect taxes, if the distribution of income were kept the
same. The work-leisure choice certainly would be largely unaffected
under these circumstances. The saving-consumption decision would be
affected by the tax postponement under a consumption tax. While the
implicit interest-rate change would not appear to provide much induce-
ment for important shifts in consumer behavior, the fact that consump-
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tion taxes act as a capital levy on existing wealth held for future con-
sumption (a point Kaldor has properly emphasized) may give them
more leverage than would appear at first glance. But still it is difficult
to think of substantial increases in saving coming about in this way.
But the direct-indirect, or consumption-income, tax revision almost
surely is motivated by a desire for redistribution of the tax load. Pro-
gressive income taxation inevitably requires higher marginal rates than
proportional or regressive income or consumption taxation. Attention
is then focused on reducing these high marginal rates because, other
things being equal, they have a more distorting effect than lower-rate
taxes. Or, even if they did not, one may believe that distortions in
work-leisure and consumer-saving decisions of the high-income group
are particularly damaging to growth because of the crucial quality of
their effort or of their saving. All we can honestly say here, I suppose,
is that we do not know. Such evidence as we have does not suggest
important gains will be observed in saving or effort from redistribution
of income. And I should emphasize that this has little to do with the
form of taxes—whether direct or indirect—but the income groups from
which they come.
/Atthis point a cryptic word should be said about the heavy taxation
of corporations. There are fiscal devices short of a complete overhaul of
this tax which appear to provide a substantial blunting of its adverse
effects on investment—through loss offsets, accelerated depreciation, or
investment credits. The loss-offset argument is a powerful one to my
mind, given the substantial possibilities to absorb losses open to the
going concern, and given the way that corporate losses can transmigrate.
Indeed, instead of impeding the market in corporate shells, perhaps we
should be advocating steps to perfect it.
Finally, we come to changes in the level of taxation, and again its
significance seems to have little to do with the nature of the tax. Waiving
political problems, there is virtually no limit to the degree to which
consumption outlays can be reduced and resources freed for investment.
Substantial changes in growth rates, requiring, say, a 20 or 25 per cent
increase in plant and equipment outlays, would call for heroic measures
along this line coupled with a substantial stimulation of investment,
either by easy money to domestic long-term borrowers or by special
incentive devices. Whether or not it could succeed is something about
which we have a right to be dubious. But it would have vastly more
chance of success than merely shifting existing taxes, and would depend
primarily on the size, rather than the kind, of additional taxes imposed.
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Indeed, if the size of the debt imposes political restraints on fiscal policy,
it may be far wiser to impose taxes with the least effect on consumption
in order to maximize the budget surplus with a given level of consump-
tion.
It is easy to look around the world and find examples of rapid eco-
nomic growth coupled with high indirect taxes. It is also easy to find
counter examples. Indeed, in looking at various states in this country,
I suspect it may be nearer the truth that economic growth determines
tax structures rather than the other way around. But, rather than end
on such a skeptical note, let me re-emphasize my agreement with
Harberger that the large distortions in investment decisions brought
about by capital gains and by the treatment of the mineral industries
and owner-occupied dwellings could well be eliminated to our economic
gain.
WILLIAM FELLNER, Yale University
I feel considerable respect for Harberger's contribution and am sure
the conference feels the same way; I therefore believe that my comments
should concentrate on those parts of Harberger's argument which in my
view should be qualified. One or two of the questions which I intended
to raise have already been discussed by Brown and so I will not raise
them again.
On a much lower level of abstraction than that of Harberger's paper,
some economists (including myself) have suggested that, given the con-
ditions of the 1960's, the weight of direct taxes relative to that of
indirect taxes may be too great in the American tax structure. Argu-
ments of the following sort have been used:
1. The relative weight of direct taxes is appreciably greater in our
tax system than in. that of any other major country.
2. All non-lump•-sum taxes push the taxpayer around, that is to say,
they violate the Pareto conditions.
3. For various sales taxes on nonnecessities may be said to
push the taxpayer in directions more consistent with avowed policy ob-
jectives than does the individual income tax or the corporate profits tax.
4. While ideally income taxes and corporate profits taxes could be
shaped in such a way as to be milder violators of the Pareto conditions
than are excises, it is not at all obvious that in reality they can be so
shaped.
5. Last but not least, while blueprints of the graduated income tax
make this tax appear to be more equitable than other taxes, the observ-
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able deviations from the blueprints are very significant indeed, so that
in the final analysis one would hesitate to make a stronger statement
than thatsome ways the graduated income tax, as we know it, is
more equitable than indirect taxes are but in various other ways the
income tax is particularly inequitable.
On the basis of considerations no more refined than these, some of us
have questioned whether it is wise for the United States to maintain a
direct-to-indirect ratio of roughly 1.6 to 1 when all other maj or countries
have a ratio of less than 1 to 1. Even if smaller countries are included in
the comparison, our ratio is probably the highest in the world with the
exception of Sweden. I mean here the ratio of central and local govern-
ment revenues from direct taxes to revenues from indirect taxes, with
social security contributions excluded from both categories. The place of
the United States in such rankings does not seem to depend to any great
extent on the treatment of social security. Nor do I believe that our
place in the ranking could have been affected appreciably by changes
that have occurred since 1957, the year for which the above figures are
given.
On this lower level of analytical refinement, it is difficult to gauge
the effect that the fiscal program of the present administration may
have on our direct-to-indirect ratio without making very specific assump-
tions about the prospective increase in GNP and about the GNP-
elasticity of different kinds of tax revenue. But I do believe that some
lowering of the American ratio may be expected for the 1960's, particu-
larly in view of the rising trends in state and local indirect taxation.
Turning now to Harberger's study, one may ask to what extent the
great analytical ingenuity expressed in his paper is helpful in guiding
the reader's judgment about the desirable direct-indirect mix. About
this I feel somewhat skeptical, although not entirely negative. The
reason for my skepticism is that his conclusions, which in his words are
"heartening to those who felt all along that direct taxation is better than
indirect," are in the end more dependent on very risky numerical guesses
than appears to be the case at first sight.
To argue this point I must engage in a few numerical exercises which,
however, need to be combined with analytical considerations. Let me
hasten to add that I consider it a real merit of Harberger's paper that
it can serve as a basis for such exercises—no doubt also for more elabo-
rate ones than those here.
I will begin by saying that the data which Harberger uses in Sec-
tion III to discuss the reduction of weekly hours as a result of wage
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increases during the period 1900—57 may be strongly influenced by the
fact that a reduction of hours and a rise in average hourly earnings
frequently come in one institutional package. Strong unions must be
aware of the likelihood that if a demand for a shorter normal workweek
proves successful, and the actual workweek is shortened, this makes it
easier to bargain for higher hourly earnings, partly because the labor
market is made tighter and partly because it is obviously not the inten-
tion to let the workers pay out of their weekly earnings for any large
share of the price of their additional leisure. If the wage rate earned by
individual workers were increased and all other contractual and institu-
tional factors were held constant (but the workers in question were
allowed to vary the number of hours performed), they might have sig-
nificantly less incentive to reduce their work time than they do in the
actual circumstances in which the two gains come in one package.
Furthermore, other things equal, the shortening of the workweek in-
creases the income of some workers who with a longer workweek might
find it more difficult to obtain employment—this is the work-spreading
effect of the shorter workweek—and, to the extent that unions are
guided by this particular objective, the data do not lend themselves at
all to estimating the elasticities with which Harberger is concerned. If
for these reasons someone suggested that Harberger should have esti-
mated e' to be merely one-half of —0.25 (rather than —0.25), I would
have no strong convictions about who was right.
Also, if someone suggested that Harberger should have estimated his
Wterm at —0.50 rather than at his wholly conjectural figure of
—0.375,I would have no strong convictions about which guess was
more realistic. Perhaps if the average worker received a large gift in the
form of a perpetual annuity, he would use over his lifetime one-half of
this windfall to secure for himself and members of his family additional
leisure (and only half of the gift would accrue as a net addition to money
income), while if the wage rate rises substantially he would utilize a
much higher proportion of the additional earnings potential for the ac-
quisition of additional earnings. Who knows? Reason does set limits to
guesswork in such matters, but in this case the limits are very wide
indeed. If e' were —0.125 and Wwere —0.50, the estimate of e
would have to be changed from Harberger's —0.125 to —0.375.
Finally, perhaps the problem of excises should be considered as a
problem of comparing a rather general taxation of nonnecessities with a
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taxation of income; in other words, the intuitively interesting problem
might be conceived as one of excises imposed on, say, between 30 and 40
per cent of the output. If now the demand-elasticity of the taxed goods
were between —0.5 and —0.6, this would mean that the method used
in Section IV of Harberger's paper would yield for the income tax a
welfare cost of roughly 25 per cent or more (instead of a negligible
fraction) of the welfare cost of the excises. I think such guesses are no
more but also no less relevant than Harberger's. I would not even say
that he has estimated a lower limit and that I am supplying an estimate
of an upper limit. I would merely say that guesses on the basis of which
the welfare cost of income taxes is a negligible fraction of the welfare
cost of excises are no better and no worse than guesses on the basis of
which the welfare cost of income taxes amounts to, say, 25 per cent or
more of that of excises.
Pragmatically there is a big difference between concluding that the
welfare cost of the income tax is a negligible fraction of that of excises
and concluding that on the very restrictive assumptions of such a theoretical
analysis, the income-tax burden may conceivably come out at around
25 per cent or more of the excise burden. Pragmatically the difference
is large because some of the restrictive assumptions of such models need
to be relaxed and the final appraisal is much hazier if one feels uncertain
whether the "hypothesis of the negligible fraction" or, say, the "25
per cent hypothesis" is the correct point of departure on the initial
restrictive assumptions.
As I see it, the needed relaxations are connected mainly with the
following circumstances. In the first place, many of the loopholes of
direct taxation are practically inevitable, and some of the important
loopholes create the same kind of additional welfare cost% as highly
selective excises. Harberger rightly emphasizes his objections to the dif-
ferential burdens imposed by our direct taxes on alternative types of
investments. The actual situation could no doubt be improved, but by
Harberger's standards it would still be very bad. To take one example,
the preferential treatment of capital gains is an almost inevitable feature
of direct taxation, and it is also almost inevitable that many individuals
who essentially earn incomes in the ordinary sense should be able to
ride on the coattails of those deserving the capital-gains treatment,
provided these recipients of ordinary income have invested in certain chan-
nels rather than in others. Over and above the theoretically recognized
welfare cost of the direct taxes, these taxes inevitably introduce various
"excise-like" distortions, which are substantial. One could, for example,
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place the investment projects of any period into a great many categories
according to the investors' ability to turn various proportions of the
yield into capital gains, and one would have to conclude that each of
these categories is associated with a different effective tax rate!
Secondly, we should remember that the desire to promote growth
does not stem entirely from superstition. To be sure, the case for growth
rests in part on considerations of a political kind which it would be diffi-
cult to incorporate into an analytical model. I have in mind the rela-
tively greater ease: with which funds can be raised for high-priority
public expenditures, including defense, if the tax revenue increases at
given tax rates than if tax rates would have to be increased. But the
case for growth rests in part also on the stimulus which the search for
new knowledge (including basic research) receives from industrial inno-
vation. We are faced here with a two-way relationship: not only does
new knowledge lead to industrial innovation but industrial innovation,
which undoubtedly requires capital formation, also leads .tofurther
acquisition of basic knowledge. The acquisition of new knowledge is
frequently associated with favorable external effects (external to the
investor who in a sense turns a .semiflnished invention into a finished
one). Thus if the taxpayer needs to be pushed around, we may in some
cases prefer to push him in the direction of saving even if, in terms of
Harberger's application of the Pareto criteria, we hurt him somewhat
more than we wou.ld by the taxes which push him away from saving.
Let me summarize. I suggest that it makes an appreciable difference
whether we do or do not substitute other reasonable numerical guesses
for Harberger's. If we engage in such substitutions, the result will be
that, even on the simplifying assumptions implied in this type of
analysis, the welfare cost of direct taxes ceases to be a "negligible
fraction" of that of excises. In this case, the final appraisal depends to
a large extent on how much weight we attribute to factors that are
disregarded in the initial simplified models. When account is taken of
such additional considerations, even the strongest initial conclusions
become shaky, and weaker initial conclusions become all the shakier.
As to my own general appraisal, I will say that Harberger's paper
has strengthened my conviction that the economist's argument for direct
taxes cannot be brushed aside. However, I continue to be inclined to
the view that no unqualified argument can be made for the superiority
of the practically feasible kinds of direct taxation, and it does seem to
me that in the postwar era the direct-indirect mix of our tax structure
has been slanted too strongly toward direct taxation. At its practical
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best, each type of taxation involves its special kind of "inefficiency"
(pushing-around effect), and also its special kind of "inequity." These
various kinds of inevitable inefficiency and inequity need to be mixed
with a view to the general policy objectives of a country in each period
of its development.
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